My Lords, I set out in my opening remarks the principle that lies behind the amendments that I tabled: namely, that the CQC should have more operational autonomy in its day-to-day activities. I sense that the principle is not inimical to many noble Lords. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, are in contrast to that principle and seek to tie the hands of the regulator and commit it to considering specific issues in all circumstances.
I say straightaway that the issues raised by the noble Lords are important: namely, how providers deal with the most commonly recurring conditions in specific settings, and how hospitals are implementing NICE guidance on the use of medicines. I do not argue that the CQC should not consider these issues. It has made clear in its consultation document, A New Start, that NICE guidance will play an integral role in its new performance-assessment methodology. That shows that we can trust the regulator to set its own priorities and to change them in response to new challenges. However, I submit that they should not be in the Bill.
Noble Lords questioned the CQC’s role in the oversight of commissioning of both health and adult social care. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, tabled an amendment that would have the effect of allowing the CQC to carry out a study of the efficiency of commissioning without seeking the approval of the Secretary of State.
I will explain the approach that we are taking. We are maintaining powers for the CQC to carry out reviews of commissioning in both health and social care. However, where this happens, we believe that it should be a special rather than a periodic review. My noble friend Lady Barker asked why. The main role of the CQC is to inspect and regulate service provision. The very name, CQC, reflects that. Where this leads the CQC to believe that there are problems with local commissioning, it will have the power to look into this further. However, any review of commissioning will impact on the CQC’s capacity to regulate service provision. Therefore, it is only right that this should be carefully considered and subject to ministerial agreement.
If a noble Lord were to ask me in what circumstances such agreement would be withheld, I would be in some difficulty because it is hard to imagine circumstances in which, if there were clear evidence of poor commissioning practices in an area, that agreement would not be forthcoming.
Special reviews can be tailored in all sorts of ways. They can be tailored to look at how commissioners are delivering specific policy objectives—for example, personalisation or service integration. The special review powers could be used to target the poorest performers, conduct thematic reviews across all local authorities—and I shall mention that again in a second—or perform reviews of a cross-section of local authorities. These reviews are a sophisticated power that allows the CQC to get to the heart of an issue in a way that periodic
reviews cannot. If there is a good case for it conducting a review of that kind, it will not be stopped from doing so.
The noble Lord, Lord Warner, questioned the whole principle of ministerial sign-off for these special reviews. In fact, all special reviews and investigations by the CQC under Section 48 of the 2008 Act currently require the approval of the Secretary of State, so, in that sense, we are not doing anything radically new.
As I said, the CQC will be able to carry out a special review of commissioning where there is evidence that commissioning practices are contributing to the provision of poor care for patients and service users. A prime example of where the CQC could be tasked to conduct an investigation would be if it had evidence that 15-minute commissioning was taking place. That applies to any area where poor commissioning is identified as a contributory factor to the poor provision of care, either in terms of the quality of services or where access to services is raised as an issue by people who use them. I hope that that is reassuring. We are absolutely clear that the CQC will play a leading role in making sure that people receive acceptable standards of care. Indeed, only last week we announced that the CQC was considering the use of 15-minute care visits to vulnerable and elderly people. That is entirely appropriate and I emphasise that it will still have the power to carry out special reviews of that kind.
The noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, went further and said that it was counterproductive to remove the periodic review power for commissioning. She referred to statements about this made by my honourable friend, Norman Lamb, the Minister for Care and Support. I would simply say to her that retaining Section 46 functions—the periodic review functions—would offer the CQC nothing further in terms of enforcement powers against local authorities. Regardless of whether a review is undertaken under Section 46 or Section 48 in relation to an English local authority, the follow-up action remains exactly the same, with the CQC able to issue an improvement notice in the event of a local authority failing to discharge its functions and to recommend special measures to the Secretary of State in the event of substantial failings.
Our approach will allow the CQC to focus its efforts on those areas where there are concerns about commissioning, rather than on all commissioning, including commissioning where the normal oversight arrangements have revealed no overt problems. I should now like to come to those oversight arrangements, because the noble Baroness asked me who is responsible for the oversight of commissioners if it is not the CQC. We need to remember that commissioners are already regularly overseen, in a number of ways, in the new system. In the case of the commissioning of health services, the new NHS architecture has NHS England taking the central role in performance-managing the commissioning of NHS services. It ensures that clinical commissioning groups deliver the best possible services and outcomes for patients. The CCG assurance framework has been developed precisely to ensure that the CCGs are working to improve services and the quality of care for patients.
This new system is also more transparent. The CCG outcomes indicator set will support CCGs and health and well-being partners in improving health outcomes by providing comparative information on the quality of health services commissioned by CCGs and the associated health outcomes, and it will support transparency and accountability by making this information available to patients and the public. That is new. The first quarterly assurance conversations have now taken place between NHS England and CCGs. We expect that CCGs will want to make the outcome of these conversations available publicly as part of the commitment to transparency. The board will publish an annual assessment at the end of 2013-14, as required by legislation.
In addition, NHS England has its own governance processes in place, including the development of the direct commissioning assurance framework to demonstrate that it meets the standards required. As this is developed further, elements will be introduced to bring external scrutiny to its board and function. Ultimately, NHS England is held to account by the Department of Health for its commissioning activity against its delivery of the priorities set in the mandate.
That does not mean that there is no independent scrutiny of NHS commissioning. Health and well-being boards and local Healthwatch will ensure that the public voice is heard where there are concerns about the design and commissioning of services. Where local Healthwatch identifies concerns, it can raise these with Healthwatch England, which can in turn request the CQC to take action. Where the CQC has strong concerns that commissioning is having an impact on the quality and safety of provision, it can initiate—with ministerial permission—a special review or investigation. This is a much richer tapestry than perhaps some noble Lords have portrayed it.
On local authority commissioning, other measures in the Bill will strengthen the duties on local authorities in exercising their care and support functions. These include a new express duty to promote people’s well-being and a duty to shape local care markets to ensure that they are sustainable and diverse and that they offer high-quality care and support. They will not, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, fears, be left to themselves. To start with, the department will work with the local government and adult social care sector to produce statutory guidance on local authority commissioning of care and support. As well as this, the Government are committed to ensuring that there is a clear link between local authority commissioning and the outcomes and experiences of service users. That will be achieved through the adult social care outcomes framework, which will give local people, local Healthwatch and others robust and comparable information on councils’ performance. The Government are committed to making information on adult social care outcomes even more accessible and readily understood by people who use care and the wider public further to enhance transparency.
As with NHS commissioning, local Healthwatch and health and well-being boards will be able, through Healthwatch England, to raise concerns with the CQC about poor commissioning. This is independent, regular scrutiny that will be driven by the views of those with
direct experience of service failings—the service users themselves. Although this system is in its early stages, I genuinely believe that the mechanics are in place to ensure that local authority commissioning is scrutinised regularly and in a way that it has not been before.
My noble friend Lord Deben referred to the Localism Bill and wanted assurance that the powers given to the CQC will not be circumvented in various ways. I can assure my noble friend that it is not our intention that the powers given to the CQC will be circumvented by other legislative proposals or any other means.
My noble friend Lady Barker asked why we are stopping the CQC doing what it does now, and whether there is any evidence that the power has been misused. As I am sure my noble friend will agree, the CQC plays a very important role in regulating and inspecting health and care services. It is the nation’s chief whistleblower on health, but to do its job properly it must be able to act without fear or favour from the Government of the day. In a nutshell, we want to make it a stronger organisation by ensuring that it has the freedom and independence always to speak out about patient safety concerns, irrespective of who is in Government. The removal of the need for the CQC to gain the approval of the Secretary of State for its programme of inspections and so on will particularly complement the role of the CQC’s new chief inspectors in providing an authoritative and independent judgment of the quality of health and social care services.
I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, that the main objective for the CQC, as set out in the 2008 Act, is centred on service provision. The objective is to protect and promote the health, safety and welfare of people who use services. It will do this, as it does at the moment, through looking at service provision and it will look at local authority commissioning when there is evidence of problems.
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Finally, I turn to the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about the regular interaction between the CQC and my right honourable friend the Secretary of State. I hope he will bear in mind that the Department of Health and the Secretary of State act as system stewards, overseeing the work of the CQC and other arm’s-length bodies. It is essential as the regulator of providers that the CQC is independent in its judgments. That is not to say that Ministers and the department should not keep a regular watching brief over what is—he will acknowledge—a very active scene out there, not least in the area of the quality of care delivered by certain hospitals.
Having taken a little time over this, I hope that I have reassured noble Lords not only about the merits of our amendments but that their own fears about what we are asking the CQC to concentrate on are misplaced.