My Lords, the noble Lord has cited certain figures and I think it would be wise for me to give him a fuller answer than I have before me. Although I would say this, I believe that our arguments are robust. However, I will follow up his points and write to him.
Clause 13 specifies that various conditions must apply in prosecuting the offence. In particular, it must be established that the person accused of the offence should, first, have copied a registered design; secondly, knew that the design they copied was a registered design; and thirdly, copied the design without the consent of the registered design holder. Under the clause, it is also an offence knowingly to use a copied design in the course of business activities in order to profit from that copying. This would include acts such as marketing, exporting, using or stocking the design in the course of business. A prosecution will be successful only if the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the criminal legal burden of proof; that of being “beyond all reasonable doubt”. This is a high standard to achieve and will help to ensure that the offence does not affect innovation or legitimate and competitive risk-taking within business. The offence will not apply if the defendant can show reasonable grounds for believing that the design in question was invalid or where the person charged with the offence shows that there was no infringement of the registered design.
The clause provides that a trial may be on summary trial in a magistrates’ court or trial on indictment in a Crown Court. Of course, this will depend on the severity of the case. In a magistrates’ court, conviction could result in a term of imprisonment of up to six months in England and Wales and Northern Ireland and 12 months in Scotland, or a fine up to the statutory maximum, or both. In the Crown Court, conviction on indictment could result in imprisonment for up to 10 years, or to a fine, or both. The offence in this clause will be applicable only to designs registered prior to infringement, not to those registered after the copying has taken place. Under the clause, trading standards departments will have the power to enforce registered design copying, as they do now for trademark and copyright offences. They will also have powers of forfeiture.
Noble Lords raised a number of points. The noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Browne, raised the issue of the “chilling effect” of criminal sanctions. I reiterate that the clause is not intended to have a chilling effect on innovation or legitimate and competitive risk-taking within business. This is something that we were very much mindful of during the drafting of the offence as our policy intention was to target only those people who deliberately use somebody else’s ideas and creativity. Further, the offence depends on the infringing product having been made “exactly or substantially” to the registered design, and this should catch only those who set out to copy a registered design, not those who make distinguishable follow-on designs. This is why the offence requires the defendant
to have known or have reason to believe that the design he or she copied was registered by someone else. Furthermore, this will have to be shown to the criminal standard of proof of “beyond all reasonable doubt”, which is an exceptionally high standard for prosecutors to meet in court.
As I mentioned earlier, this chilling effect has not been seen in Germany and the assertion of a chilling effect does not appear to be borne out by the experience of other jurisdictions that retain a criminal sanction for design copying. Germany is renowned for having a highly effective design system and it retains both civil and criminal sanctions. Although it is difficult to draw direct causality between Germany’s use of criminal sanctions and its successful system, we know that Germany has 10 times as many registered designs as the UK and it is unlikely that the criminal sanction has had an adverse effect on the number of registered designs or on the strong innovation performance of German SMEs, which is so evident to us all.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked whether it was fair to prosecute those who unknowingly stock or sell copied designs and cited the examples of Apple and Samsung. The innocent use of a copied design in the course of business would not be caught by the offence; for example, a retailer would be protected if a third party had manufactured the copies and sold them to the retailer as their own. In this case, the retailer would not be acting with the knowledge that the design was a copy and would not be found guilty of committing the offence. The activities that constitute using a design under the offence reflect the definition for “use of a design” contained in Section 7 of the Registered Designs Act 1949. Innocent acts are protected, therefore, under the clause because it contains the test of,
“knowing, or having reason to believe”
that a design is copied.