My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 32. I suspect that on Amendment 31 I am in for a little more teasing from my noble friend Lord McNally. The noble Lord shakes his head; that is a shame. In that case I am in for more teasing from the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad.
Clause 16 would insert a new section into the Criminal Justice Act 2003, with regard to the permission that is required before an offender who is the subject of a relevant order may change residence. In new Section 220A(4) we are told that there are two grounds available to either the officer or the court, which in effect is the appeal body here from a responsible officer’s decision. I would like to be completely sure that these are the only grounds. I am sure that they are, but I wanted to make the point.
We also wanted to add another provision which would, in effect, alter the presumption in these circumstances. When refusal was given, there would not simply have to be an opinion that a change of residence would be likely to prevent compliance with a requirement or hinder rehabilitation; it would go further. The purpose of the requirement or the rehabilitation would have to be significantly less likely to be achieved if the offender were to change residence. The reason is that a restriction on moving one’s home or one’s household—possibly having to move because of family problems such as the offender and partner splitting up, or because there are job prospects somewhere easier to reach from a new home—are all extremely important and part of rehabilitation. I am not convinced that every possible circumstance is covered by subsection (4)(a) and (b) of new Section 220A. I beg to move.