My Lords, on 20 March, your Lordships’ House voted by a majority of 54 to exclude Clause 27 from the Bill. The reasons of principle and practicality as to why your Lordships’ House so voted remain valid. They were not altered by the vote of the House of Commons last week. Indeed, the debate in the House of Commons, which was limited by a timetable Motion to 45 minutes, barely addressed, let alone answered, the concerns which were expressed on all sides of this House on Report.
I remind your Lordships why your Lordships’ House voted to exclude Clause 27. I want to do so because the noble Viscount’s speech conspicuously avoided, if I may respectfully say so, all the concerns which the House expressed on Report. I commiserate with him because he has been asked to defend the indefensible.
The first point is that Clause 27 frustrates the very purpose of employment rights. We can, and do, disagree around this House and in the other place as to what the content of employment rights should be. That is entirely proper. They are debated and amended from time to time as we see the balance between employer and employee and as we perceive the public interest. However, over the past 50 years all Conservative and Labour Governments have recognised that an employer and an employee cannot be allowed to contract out of those employment rights which Parliament has seen fit to guarantee. That is because it would defeat the very purpose of conferring those employment rights. They are conferred precisely because freedom of contract—a voluntary agreement, as the Minister describes it—does not protect the worker or the job applicant who lacks basic bargaining power. To allow basic employment rights to become a commodity to be traded in the way
that Clause 27 proposes would frustrate their very purpose. We would not envisage for a moment allowing a manufacturer of goods to contract out of his, her or its obligation to the consumer simply because the latter chooses, voluntarily, to pay a lower purchase price.
The need for protection in the employment context is most obvious in the case of the person who is seeking employment. The Minister in the House of Commons, Mr Michael Fallon, emphasised last week that a Clause 27 agreement is voluntary. The Minister repeated that statement today but, as he accepts, the employer may under Clause 27 advertise the vacancy on the basis that it will be filled only on Clause 27 terms. In the real world, outside the House of Commons, a person who is offered employment on Clause 27 conditions only is not voluntarily accepting such conditions. In the current economic climate, he or she will have no practical choice. I welcome the fact that the Government have removed one aspect of the unfairness of Clause 27—that is that a person refusing work on Clause 27 terms would have lost jobseeker’s allowance; a quite extraordinary position—but the fact that the Government have removed the most outrageous aspect of this proposal does not mean that what remains is acceptable.
The first objection is that the clause proceeds on a theory of voluntary agreement that frustrates the very purpose of conferring employment rights and is wholly unrealistic. The second objection is the damage that this clause will cause. A number of noble Lords from the government Benches—I repeat, from the government Benches—made this point on Report and in Committee far more powerfully than I could hope to do. The noble Lords, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean and Lord King of Bridgewater, both of whom served as Employment Ministers, the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, the noble Lord, Lord Deben—all of whom I very pleased to see in their places—and other noble Lords on the government Benches explained, from their extensive business and political experience, just how damaging it would be to industrial harmony to allow employers to buy off basic employment rights, how no sensible employer would consider this to be beneficial and how Clause 27 would do enormous damage to the cause of promoting employee share ownership. I am very sorry indeed that the Government have chosen not only not to listen to this House but not to listen to the wisdom and experience on their own Benches. The Minister must know that there is not just a lack of enthusiasm for this measure on his own Benches, there is a positive hostility to it that makes the Government’s insistence on pursuing this cause and this clause, in the word used by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, in Committee, “mystifying”.
The third objection to Clause 27 is that even the case which was advanced by the Government in the House of Commons last week does not begin to justify the broad scope of the clause. The Government’s case, as expressed last week by Mr Fallon, is that Clause 27 will encourage new and small high-tech companies which will be more willing to employ people with special skills. Even if noble Lords were to accept that assumption—and it begs a large number of questions —it would justify only a specific and narrowly drawn statutory provision tailored to the specific circumstances
which are said to justify its enactment. The generality of Clause 27 inevitably means that it will be used and it will inevitably be abused by the Gradgrinds of this world. This concern was expressed on Report by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, in his powerful speech against Clause 27.
5.45 pm
My fourth and final objection to Clause 27 has already been raised this afternoon and is that the clause contains no provision for independent advice. The Government have refused to accept that statutory rights should be lost only if the employee has received advice from an independent adviser on the legal and financial consequences of the agreement. These consequences are inevitably complex and the suggestion that jobseekers can simply go off to lawyers or accountants and get advice on these matters, as the Minister suggested this afternoon, is quite unrealistic. As the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, has already mentioned, Parliament has, in Section 288 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1992, required independent advice in the context of compromise agreements to settle employment disputes in individual cases in employment tribunals.
The Minister simply has no answer as to why independent advice is a statutory requirement before a compromise agreement is reached in a tribunal but no independent advice will be required before the employee signs away these employment rights altogether. This is a major decision for any employee, especially when there is, of course, no guarantee that the shares will increase, or even hold, their value. Indeed, if the company is making employees redundant, which is the context of this clause, it is highly likely that the shares will be worth less than £2,000 or nothing at all when the individual is made redundant. This concern was expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Myners, earlier in this debate.
For all these reasons, Clause 27 frustrates the purpose of employment rights and is damaging to industry. The Government’s own case does not explain why we need so broad a provision and there is no requirement for independent legal or financial advice. I invite your Lordships’ House to stand by its principled objection to Clause 27. The Government and the House of Commons have simply failed to address the concerns about this clause on all sides of the House. They should be asked to think again about this important matter. I beg to move.