My Lords, in moving that this House do agree with Commons Amendment 3, I shall speak also to Commons Amendments 4, 7 to 10, 32 to 37, 42, 43, 51, 61 to 92, 93 to 130 and 132. This group of amendments covers a range of issues in respect of provisions in Part 2 of the Bill, as well as adding some new provisions to that part, but I believe that they will generally be welcomed. I propose to focus my remarks on the most significant of these amendments.
Commons Amendment 3 makes a specific and technical amendment to the youth secure remand provisions in Section 102 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. Under those provisions, local authorities are liable to pay the Youth Justice Board the accommodation costs of children subject to secure remand. As of 3 December 2012, courts ordering a secure remand must designate a local authority as the designated authority for the child. Full financial responsibility for the accommodation costs of securely remanded children will fall to the designated local authorities as of 1 April.
This amendment addresses a gap in the current law. When remanding a child, the court will tend to designate the local authority where the child lives. However, this is not always clear at the early stages of the case, so the court may designate a different local authority. By the next hearing, more information is generally available, so the court can change the designation to the local authority where the child lives. But under Section 102 of the 2012 Act, the liability to pay the secure accommodation costs for the period before the change is made still rests with the original local authority. This creates an unfair burden on a local
authority where the child does not live, and puts at risk the effective recovery of costs by the Youth Justice Board. Therefore, Commons Amendment 3 gives the court powers to make a replacement designation, so all the accommodation costs can be recovered from the local authority that has subsequently been identified.
In addition, the amendment introduces the assumption that the court should designate the local authority where the child lives rather than the authority where the offence took place. The Government believe that in most cases it is right to designate the local authority where the child lives in accordance with the habitual residence test from which the duty for a local authority to provide accommodation and support flows. Of course, the court will retain overall discretion over deciding which local authority to designate.
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On the amendments on judicial appointments, the House will recall that as part of the changes the Government are making to the judicial appointments process, the details of the selection process for certain judicial offices, including for the office of the Lord Chief Justice and heads of division, will be removed from the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and instead be set out in secondary legislation. As the current Lord Chief Justice is soon to retire, the Government want a new selection process for the Lord Chief Justice to be applied to the selection of his successor. If the appointment process is to be completed in good time for the start of the new judicial year, we cannot wait until the required secondary legislation is made once the Bill is enacted. Commons Amendment 4 therefore adds the new selection process to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and provides for the process to come into force on Royal Assent. This is a transitory measure and will cease to have effect when the subsequent regulations are made.
Commons Amendment 93 applies the tipping-point provision to UK Supreme Court appointments, similar to the one being applied to other judicial appointments by Part 2 of Schedule 13 to the Bill. The Government’s position has always been that the tipping point should apply to Supreme Court appointments. We believe that Section 159 of the Equality Act 2010 could already be applied to Supreme Court appointments, but on Third Reading my noble friend Lord Marks expressed some doubt as to whether this was the case. After considering the points raised by my noble friend, the Government brought forward Commons Amendment 93, which removes any uncertainty that a tipping point can apply to Supreme Court appointments. Commons Amendment 130 relates to the judicial deployment provisions in Schedule 14 to the Bill, which aim to provide greater flexibility in deploying judges to different courts and tribunals. After further consultation with the judiciary about the extent of these flexible deployment provisions, and given the particular skills and experience needed in Crown Court cases, we have concluded that the Crown Court should be removed from the deployment provisions.
On the UK Supreme Court, I am sure the House will wholeheartedly welcome Commons Amendment 7. Both on Report and at Third Reading in this House,
the Government indicated that we were discussing the appointments process for the chief executive of the UK Supreme Court with the president of the court with a view to arriving at an agreed way forward. I am pleased to report that these discussions were successfully concluded, and as a result Commons Amendment 7 amends the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 so that the president of the UK Supreme Court, rather than the Lord Chancellor, is made responsible for the appointment of the chief executive, and it is no longer necessary for the chief executive to agree the staffing structure of the court with the Lord Chancellor.
On broadcasting, as the House is aware, Clause 28 confers on the Lord Chancellor the power to make an order, with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, setting out circumstances in which the current legislative ban on broadcasting court proceedings below the Supreme Court level may be disapplied. When we debated these provisions previously, I believe all were agreed that while it is important for justice to be seen to be done, this must not be at the expense of the proper administration of justice. I remember talking to this particular amendment at the time. Let me just reiterate some of the reassurances that were given. Any order made under Clause 28 will be subject to a triple lock requiring: first, the agreement of the Lord Chancellor; secondly, the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice; and, thirdly, scrutiny by Parliament under the affirmative procedure. In addition to this, there is a fourth lock, which will give judges the discretion to stop filming or to refuse to allow broadcast of recorded footage in a particular case.
Clause 28(3) sets out the judicial tests that a judge must apply when considering whether to stop or prohibit filming in order to protect the interests of victims, witnesses and other parties. As currently drafted, only individuals who are party to proceedings are protected. We strongly believe that the court should be allowed to consider the impact on individuals who are not party to proceedings—for example, the families of victims and offenders—when considering whether to use the judicial veto. As such, Commons Amendment 9 would modify these tests to give the judge a wider discretion to stop the filming or broadcasting of court proceedings.
The requirement for the court to consider “the fairness of any proceedings” would be replaced with a wider requirement to consider the interests of justice, while the requirement for the court to consider whether “any person involved in the proceedings is not unduly prejudiced” would be replaced with a broader requirement for the court to consider whether any person will be unduly prejudiced, irrespective of whether they are a party to the proceedings. Commons Amendments 8, 10, 33 and 37 put beyond doubt the fact that the UK Supreme Court may record and broadcast its proceedings. They are essentially amendments that clarify this position.
On the issue of self-defence, as the House will recall, Clause 30 provides householders with greater protection to defend themselves in the event that they are confronted by intruders in their homes. Householders will not be treated as criminals in these terrifying circumstances if they use a level of force that was reasonable in the circumstances as they saw them but which turns out to have been disproportionate. The
Government are anxious to avoid any unnecessary delay in delivering what is a specific coalition commitment and an important enhancement to the protection that householders have to defend themselves. We think the public would find it difficult to understand why commencement had been delayed beyond Royal Assent if, in the intervening period, a householder came face to face with a burglar and could not rely on the heightened defence. Commons Amendment 43, therefore, will mean that the householder defence provisions in Clause 30 of the Bill will come into effect on Royal Assent.
In moving on to the restorative justice provisions in the Bill and Commons Amendment 132, I reiterate the Government’s absolute commitment to ensuring that high-quality RJ is embedded into and established across the criminal justice system. Following further debate in the other place, it was agreed that it would be beneficial to amend the Bill to provide that RJ practitioners must have regard to any guidance that is issued by the Secretary of State, with a view to encouraging good practice in the delivery of pre-sentence restorative justice. The Government believe this will allow us to ensure that RJ can continue to grow and local innovation can continue to flourish while at the same time ensuring that good practice is spread nationwide. Commons Amendment 132 gives effect to this.
Finally, Commons Amendments 32, 34, 35, 42, 51, 61 to 92 and 94 to 129 make a number of minor and technical amendments to judicial appointments and the family court, as well as removing the privilege amendment made when the Bill was last in this House. I can provide further details should any noble Lord have a particular question about them. I beg to move.