My Lords, I beg to move that this House agree with Commons Amendments 1, 26 and 137.
These amendments restore to the Bill the power to confer counterterrorism functions on the National Crime Agency by means of an order, subject to the super-affirmative procedure. Noble Lords will recall that this House removed what was then Clause 2 of the Bill at our Report stage.
We have reflected carefully on the concerns raised in this House about the level of scrutiny afforded by the super-affirmative process. We remain firmly of the view that this is an appropriate matter for secondary legislation and that the super-affirmative procedure provides substantial opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny and for Members of both Houses to influence the shape of the legislation. This question was debated at length in the House of Commons and although there were Members who shared the concerns of some in this House, ultimately the position of the Government prevailed when the matter was put to a vote.
In seeking to restore this clause to the Bill, your Lordships’ House will note that we have retained the important safeguards for the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, in recognition of the sensitivity of the arrangements for countering terrorism in Northern Ireland. Primacy for the operational response to counterterrorism in Northern Ireland rests with the chief constable of the PSNI. The order-making power respects that; it cannot change that; and, indeed, it ensures that there is clarity as to the relationship between the PSNI and the NCA should counterterrorism functions be conferred on the agency in the future. What is important is that, should a future review of counterterrorism policing arrangements conclude that the NCA should have a counterterrorism role, that role, whatever it may be, must dovetail with the distinct counterterrorism arrangements in Northern Ireland.
We recognise that any decision to give the National Crime Agency a counterterrorism role will be an important one. We have no wish to diminish, impede or lose those aspects of the current arrangements that work
well. However, with the creation of a National Crime Agency, it is reasonable that the Government consider afresh how the current counterterrorism policing arrangements work and to review whether there might be a role that the agency could play to enhance our response to the terrorist threat. These are questions that can sensibly be considered only after the NCA is up and running and then only after a full review. If a decision is made in the future that there is a counterterrorism role for the National Crime Agency, then the super-affirmative process, and the conditions that are tied to it, provide ample opportunity for this House and the other place to scrutinise the draft order to the degree that it deserves.
Under the super-affirmative procedure, the Home Secretary must first consult with persons affected by the proposed order. Thereafter, she must publish the draft order and a document which explains it. There is then scope for a committee of either House to report on the draft order which the Home Secretary must consider along with any other representations before the original order, or a revised version of it following such reports and representations, is placed before both Houses for approval. It will then be for both Houses to debate and agree the order before it is made. This is not a process that should be taken lightly.
Let me be clear: the power contained in this provision may not be used to remove any function from any body, including police forces. What this Bill proposes is the creation of a National Crime Agency charged with the responsibility to lead the fight against serious, organised and complex crime. Commons Amendment 1 is concerned with enabling the Home Secretary to give effect to the outcome of a review which, by definition, had concluded that the existing arrangements in respect of counterterrorism would be enhanced by conferring relevant responsibilities in this area on the NCA.
I again pray in aid the conclusions of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. In its report on the Bill the committee agreed with the Government that such a provision was not unprecedented, and indeed the notion that additional functions could be conferred on a statutory body by secondary legislation was well established. We have been clear throughout this process that the position remains that we have no preconceived notion as to the outcome of a review of counterterrorism policing arrangements and the future role of the NCA, if any, in those arrangements.
As some noble Lords will know, and indeed will have experience of, counterterrorism policing today is a partnership endeavour among all police forces. Chief constables each retain their full operational responsibility for policing in their force area, but they have put in place through ACPO a framework of agreements which underpin the present national counterterrorism policing arrangements. These consist of a range of national lead responsibilities and support roles distributed among several forces and undertaken by those forces on behalf of all forces.
It is right that in the future we should be giving consideration to how the NCA might be able to enhance those arrangements. We continue to believe that it is also right that we should build into the Bill the flexibility to implement the outcome of such a review in a timely
fashion through secondary legislation, but subject to a high level of parliamentary scrutiny in the form of the super-affirmative procedure. The Government would rightly be criticised if they could not implement the findings of a review for a year or more for want of the necessary primary legislation. This is not about whether the NCA should or should not exercise counterterrorism functions. That debate is for the future. Rather, the issue today is about the mechanism by which such functions could be bestowed on the agency. The mechanism provided for in Commons Amendment 1 is therefore a perfectly proper one. I would urge the House to agree the amendment and to reject Amendment 1A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith.
Amendment 1A (to the Motion)