In moving Amendment 84AEB, I wish to speak also to Amendments 84AEC to 84AEG and Amendment 84AF.
I will speak first to Amendment 84AF as it falls outside the scope of the other amendments. Clause 69 as drafted does not factor into the opt-out of ECL the situation where the rights holder is not the creator. A firmer commitment from the Government in the Bill is necessary to give more reassurance to rights holders on the ECL provisions in Clause 69 before the legislation completes its passage. This amendment was tabled as Amendment 28X in Gland Committee. An opt-out is available to copyright owners in the Bill as it stands. The amendment would extend this opt-out to exclusive licensees and authorised representatives.
In Grand Committee, the Minister committed the orphan works and extended collective licensing working group to look into this issue as part of its deliberations. While this commitment is welcome, there needs to be certainty that any regulations for extended collective licensing will include such provision. Since ECL has the effect of exercising property rights, potentially against the will of the rights owner, the ability to opt-out under subsection (3) of what will be the new Section 116B must be as straightforward and easy to implement as possible. To effectively administer the repertoire they have invested in, music publishers will need to make catalogue-wide arrangements applicable to hundreds, thousands, or potentially, millions of separate works. The grant of rights and arrangements between creators and music publishers are very often not exclusive assignments of copyright; grants can also be made by way of licences, both exclusive and non-exclusive.
It will be unworkable to have an opt-out which is exercisable only by the copyright owner or exclusive licensee. This would require a publisher to go contract by contract, checking the nature of each grant of rights and, where necessary, asking composers to sign opt-out documentation to be sent to the body seeking to operate the scheme. If the opt-out could be operated by the composer’s authorised representative, this would give a publisher or other representative the right to seek the permission from its composers to exercise an opt-out on their behalf, which could then comprise one repertoire-wide opt-out from a rights owner in a manageable way.
Practical experience abroad is that, in the absence of this possibility, ECL provisions can be manipulated by bodies operating schemes to make it impossible for right owners to opt out in any manageable way. I am informed by representatives from music publishing that one example of this is the operation of the extended collective licensing provisions enshrined in Hungarian copyright law in relation to the performing right. In Hungary, one reason for the failure of being able to rely on the opt-out came from the requirement of Artisjus that the rights owner—not any representative—provide due diligence evidencing ownership of each title in question. In relation to a repertoire of many thousands of works, this represents a huge barrier to successfully exercising the opt-out in terms of tracing the title back to its source. It is often via a complicated chain, redacting and copying documents to comply with confidentiality restrictions and then shipping these across to Hungary.
This example of abuse of proprietary rights provides ample evidence that, in the context of ECL, the burden of challenging any opt-out must sit with the entity operating the scheme and not with the individual rights owner. I believe that it is not the intention of this legislation to create such problems but it is important to guard against potential abuse. Can the Minister give assurances on this?
At the end of the day, I cannot see any downside to giving composers a choice in being able to elect to have their trusted authorised representative act on their behalf in this context. I am also not aware of a prevailing view that would be opposed to creating
such a modest requirement. Indeed, in Grand Committee, the Minister stated that the Bill does not rule out such a provision.
With the experiences of ECL in other territories in mind, I hope that Report stage is an opportunity for the Minister to clarify responsibility for overseeing due diligence in an opt-out process. I hope that the Government will use this stage of the Bill to clarify that regulations will be clear that the burden of proof for the due diligence in an opt-out will be on the body applying for ECL.
On Amendment 84AEB, copyright licensing bodies are indispensible in many circumstances. For example, no composer could keep track of all the playings of his or her song on television, radio, the internet and in concerts, pubs, hairdressers, department stores and so on; PRS for music does this collectively. However, this kind of licensing is voluntary, meaning that the rights owner gave his or her permission to PRS to license his or her works for use in broadcasts and public performances. Extended collective licensing means that the licensing body can also license works whose authors have not given permission.
Therefore, ECL—and we have debated this in Grand Committee—is potentially dangerous to rights owners. A rights owner may not know about extended collective licensing and find that his or her work has been licensed without their permission. Perhaps they would not have wanted it in that particular publication, or perhaps they had given another publication an exclusive deal. Perhaps they would have charged a different fee; if they had given permission direct, their fee would not have suffered deduction of the licensing body’s commission. Foreign composers in particular may not be aware of the licence at all and may grant conflicting rights or may not collect their fee.
The Government’s explanations always described ECL as “voluntary extended collective licensing”, but the fact is that ECL allows the licensing body to license its rights without their prior authorisation. It is government policy that the author can opt out, but this acknowledges that the licensing body has permission to license his or her rights in the first place. This permission is ultimately given by the Government by authorising the organisation to license rights that it does not in fact hold, not by the author who must withdraw by opting out.
To their credit, the Government have acknowledged the dangers inherent in ECL, and in Grand Committee on 31 January, the Minister explained the Government’s policy regarding safeguards for rights owners. However Clause 69, which enables ECLs to be created by statutory instrument, only very minimally reflects the safeguards as the Minister has now enunciated them. The Government have claimed that the Nordic ECLs provide a strong precedent. However, the safeguards are set out in the Nordic primary legislation. By “Nordic”, I mean Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland. Setting out the safeguards in primary legislation is clearly an aspect of the Nordic precedent that the UK Government should follow.
My amendments are essentially translations of the Nordic statutory provisions, adapted to the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act. The safeguards usefully include a requirement on licensing bodies to qualify,
the need to explain the type of licence being granted, the need for the authorised body to be representative, the adoption of a code of conduct, the ability to refer to the Copyright Tribunal where a claim is being made that the body is not representative or that licences go beyond scope of existing copyright licences, a limitation on the term of authorisation to five years, and clear provisions about the ability to give notice of exclusion of a work.
The Minister has said that there must be flexibility, but he has been fairly detailed in his description of what the secondary legislation will consist of. Flexibility is not therefore necessarily an argument for excluding safeguards for rights holders from the Bill, and there can be no reasonable argument against including those safeguards. I beg to move.