My Lords, I thank noble Lords for that debate. The noble Lord, Lord Best, explained clearly that his amendments are aimed at ensuring that development happens. We all want to ensure that happens, as there is otherwise no purpose in this clause. I understand the desire that, in return for an adjusted affordable housing obligation won at appeal, a developer should get on and build. Planning consent is permission to build; it is not a requirement to build. The purpose of this clause is to give developers an opportunity to build, allowing them to review schemes against prevailing market conditions and secure a viable affordable housing agreement. We should remember that without this clause many housing sites will not come forward at all, which is not what we want. Of
course, having put in place a revised agreement, we want developers to build, and that is the purpose of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Best.
Clause 6 places a three-year time limit on modified obligations made on appeal. If the development is not completed within three years, which is the other side of the coin that the noble Lord referred to—he was talking about commencement while I am talking about completion—the original affordable housing requirement will apply to those parts of the scheme which have not been commenced, so there is a difficulty for the developer in that. Developers are incentivised to build out as much of their scheme as possible within those three years. It will not be sufficient to commence one part of the development to secure the revised affordable housing obligation for the whole scheme.
For example, on a scheme of 100 homes, if 50 units are completed at the end of the three years and the remaining 50 are not commenced, the appeal decisions would require that the original obligation would apply to the remaining 50—so we would go back to 100. If developers are concerned about the viability of their scheme at the end of the three years, they can seek to modify the agreement again. This could be done through voluntary renegotiation or by making a new application under this process.
We believe that the clause ensures that we incentivise build-out and completion. Local authorities are not bound by a three-year decision, but we are clear in our draft guidance that they can follow similar time limits prescribed for appeal decisions. We believe that this decision is best made locally. Where the matter has gone to the planning inspectors, the local authority can of course put its own evidence to the Planning Inspectorate, which could include evidence on commencement of the development. That could become part of the modified planning obligation if the planning inspectors agree to it.
I hope that the noble Lord will take some comfort from our being aware that local authorities have a wide range of tools and powers to encourage development. Those may be through the way they use the Section 106 agreements flexibly or in the way that they support development through investment in infrastructure or the use of land assets. We are aware of local authorities which have introduced clawback agreements to incentivise developments and we understand that those may be appropriate in some circumstances.
More specifically on Amendment 31, which prescribes a six-month commencement for appeal decisions, I said in Committee that I thought setting a six-month period in primary legislation was too prescriptive. I am particularly concerned that placing a six-month limit to commence development will allow little time for developers to get on site—this is the other side of the coin that we have just been talking about. Not all schemes will be ready to go when they are renegotiated. Regeneration schemes where land is in multiple ownership or where planning conditions need to be met before development can commence could be excluded from this process by the six-month limit. Sites where significant work, such as decontamination, needs to be done to prepare the site for development could be excluded. We want to ensure that we deliver as many homes as
possible through this measure, not through an overly prescriptive approach, which could be counterproductive and end up with these measures having no effect.
In Amendment 30, the noble Lord, Lord Best, proposes to require the Planning Inspectorate to introduce a clawback in appeal cases whereby the local authority receives increased funds for affordable housing if the market rises. I oppose this amendment because it requires the Planning Inspectorate to make provision for a clawback agreement, which would impose a requirement that will not be appropriate in all cases. I am also concerned that this amendment might have unintended consequences. In cases, where a variable agreement would be onerous and unnecessary, the inclusion of the amendment could discourage developers from appealing. We need developers to engage in this process and ensure they can secure viable agreements and we can then secure the affordable housing.
I will now turn to the new clause on redefining commencement. The definition of commencement and material operation serves a wide range of purposes in planning law. It triggers the payment of community infrastructure levy and Section 106 revenues. Perhaps most importantly, it is used by local authorities to establish whether a development needs planning permission and can form the basis of enforcement action if a material operation has taken place without permission. In short, the amendment would have far-reaching and fundamental consequences that go far beyond its intention, which is to prevent developers from doing a minimal amount of work lawfully to implement a planning permission. The noble Lord spelled that out quite clearly.
Changing the commencement threshold in the way envisaged would not have a substantial effect on the behaviour of developers. Any new definition of commencement would simply create a new minimum threshold for such developers to build to. The additional costs for a developer in doing so would be unlikely to be significant in the context of an overall construction budget. Furthermore, the complexity of the threshold proposed would result in uncertainty and confusion that would affect all parties involved in the planning process, including local authorities. As the definition of development is a highly contested part of planning law, it would be likely to result in a significant rise in legal challenges as the courts interpreted the new definition. Any legal definition of commencement should be exactly that: the point at which a development is commenced. It would be counterfactual at best to say in legislation that a building project where the foundations or roads are 49% complete or where only 99% of the pipes have been connected has somehow not legally begun.
In short, while I recognise the problem, this is not the right solution. It would do very little to address the problem, while it would have wide-ranging consequences for other areas of planning practice and have a very significant adverse impact on local authorities, developers and third parties. There is already a power available for a local planning authority to serve a completion notice to deal with uncompleted development. However, a far more productive approach would be to address the underlying reasons for developers delaying their
schemes. The Government recognise the importance of this through a number of initiatives, such as the £570 million Get Britain Building fund to unlock stalled sites.
I hope that with these comments the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.