My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, for explaining the reasoning behind his amendments. I have also noted his opposition to the Question that Clause 23 should stand part of the Bill. In my response, it might be helpful if I set out the reasons behind the approach that the Government have taken, how Clause 23 delivers that and take up some of the noble Lord’s questions.
Clause 23 amends the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act 1945. That Act sets out the procedural requirements for any order that is subject to special parliamentary procedure. Clause 23 ensures that where a development consent order under the Planning Act 2008 is subject to SPP, consideration will be limited to the order only in so far as it authorises the compulsory acquisition of special land. This is to reflect the wording and intention of the 2008 Act.
The clause also makes similar provision for certain other compulsory acquisition powers that require an order to be subject to SPP. It applies to any order involving the compulsory acquisition of specially protected land as a result of Sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. It also applies to the Harbours Act 1964, certain provisions of the New Towns Act 1981 and the Transport and Works Act 1992. The clause will ensure that SPP applies in the way originally intended, where legislation makes clear that an order is to be subject to this procedure to a limited extent.
The need for Clause 23 reflects an inconsistency between the 1945 Act and certain more recent legislation. This was drawn to the Government’s attention by the Chairman of Committees and the Chairman of Ways and Means in their initial joint report on the Rookery South order which, as the noble Lord Faulkner knows
well, has been subject to SPP. The Planning Act 2008 provides that a development consent order which authorises the acquisition of special land is to be subject to SPP to the extent that the order authorises acquisition of such land. Consideration of that order should therefore be limited to that part of the consent order authorising the compulsory acquisition of special land.
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However, the 1945 Act does not currently make provision for Parliament to consider just part of an order. This means that decisions on matters such as whether consent for development should be granted, which have been properly decided by a Minister, are open for reconsideration by Parliament. This was not the original intention of the Planning Act 2008 or the other Acts that I have mentioned. Clause 23 seeks to resolve this inconsistency. It amends the 1945 Act so that it covers circumstances where SPP applies only to a limited extent.
The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, would limit the proposal in Clause 23 only to cases where authorisation for the compulsory acquisition of special land was granted under the provisions of the Planning Act. That would mean not addressing the inconsistency that currently exists between the 1945 Act and those other pieces of legislation which state that Special Parliamentary Procedure should apply to an order to a limited extent. Indeed, the amendment would create a new discrepancy in the way that similar compulsory acquisition provisions are handled. Given that this inconsistency has now been drawn to our attention, it is important to ensure that it is removed wherever it occurs.
It may be helpful to give a very brief summary of how the actual proposals in Clause 23 would work in practice. Clause 23 identifies a statutory provision that requires an order to be subject to SPP to be limited as a “special-acquisition provision”. New Section 1A of the 1945 Act provides that, where an order is subject to SPP under a special acquisition provision, that order is to be known as a “special authorisation”, in so far as it authorises the compulsory acquisition of special land or rights over such land. Paragraphs 3 to 18 of the new Section 1A set out modifications to the provisions of the 1945 Act. In many cases, these provide that references in the 1945 Act to the “order” are read as references to the “special authorisation”. The broad effect of this is that only petitions relating to the acquisition of special land may be considered by Parliament.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, mentioned at Second Reading, and he has again highlighted, the whole issue of petitioners bringing evidence to bear about the benefits of proposed projects as a whole where an order is subject to SPP. In response to that, I can say that the provisions in Clause 23 keep existing procedures in place regarding the handling of petitions. It will continue to be for the Lord Chairman of Committees and the Chairman of Ways and Means to decide whether petitions can be certified as “proper to be received”.
However, under Clause 23, the provisions in the 1945 Act in respect of petitions against an order must be read so that petitions against an order are construed as petitions against a special authorisation. Petitions can only therefore be certified as being proper to be received if they are petitions against the elements of an order authorising the compulsory acquisition of special land. In any particular case, it is the two chairmen’s role to make a judgment as to whether a petition is proper to be received.
Although there has been detail, I have not gone into extended detail on the provisions in this clause. However, it does ensure that, where a provision makes clear that SPP is to be limited to the consideration of the compulsory acquisition of special land, that aim is achieved. Ensuring that such legislation operates as intended is crucial to getting in place the vital infrastructure that this country needs. I therefore hope, based on my reassurances and comments, that the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, is willing to withdraw his amendment.