My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 77ZE and 77ZF. I have also given notice that I wish to oppose the Question that Clause 23 should stand part of the Bill. This is, in a sense, a continuation of our previous debate on Clause 22. Perhaps I may first respond to the Minister’s generous offer to convene a meeting with the Canal & River Trust. I am delighted to accept, as, I am sure, the trust will be; I look forward to the meeting.
I shall not repeat the arguments that I put forward regarding Clause 22 but seek simply to state that what the Government propose in Clause 23 goes further than what the two chairmen—the Chairman of Ways and Means in another place and our Chairman of Committees—recommended in their special report on the Rookery South order, when they considered the promoters’ challenges to the locus standi of the petitioners against the order. In paragraph 28 of their report, the two chairmen concluded:
“We urge the Government to amend either the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act 1945 or the Planning Act 2008—or both—so as to ensure a consistent statutory framework for the consideration of future Development Consent Orders subject to Special Parliamentary Procedure. In drawing up revised provisions, the Government will need to consult with the relevant authorities of the two Houses. In the meantime, no further orders of this type should be laid before Parliament until the statutory framework has been amended to resolve these inconsistencies”.
In its proceedings on Rookery South, the Joint Committee decided at the outset that it wished to hear evidence on the whole of each of the petitioners’ cases. The amendments proposed by Clause 23 would have prevented the Joint Committee from doing so. It is likely in future cases, once Clause 23 is in force, that any attempt to petition on issues that are not related to the acquisition of the special land are likely to be challenged at the preliminary stage before the two chairmen.
Despite that, it remains to be seen whether petitioners will be able to raise issues that are not directly related to the acquisition of the land. It has always been a central tenet of compulsory acquisition law that the applicant for the powers must demonstrate that there
is a compelling case in the public interest for the land to be acquired compulsorily—a point made with great force by the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, in the previous debate. Those words are embodied in Section 122(3) of the Planning Act. In order for a petitioner to demonstrate that there is no compelling case in the public interest, he should be able to bring evidence to bear about the benefits of the proposals as a whole, compared with the injury that he will suffer when losing his land.
As I said, Clause 23 goes further than the request made by the two chairmen, who limited their remarks to the 2008 Act. No issue has been raised as regards the compatibility between the Acquisition of Land Act 1981—and other statutes that authorise compulsory acquisition—and the 1945 Act; yet the clause seeks to limit the scope of SPP in the 1981 Act and the other examples in the same way as it does for 2008 Act cases. I should be grateful if the Minister can explain why the Government have decided that this should be the case. My amendments would have the effect of limiting the changes proposed to the SPP procedure so that they apply only to development consent orders under the Planning Act 2008. I beg to move.