My right hon. Friend is entirely right. As I observed at the time, President Clinton took the view that the treaty was the best hope that the west had of pulling China into a much more market-orientated, rules-based economy, where we could gain the benefits of a more liberal, global economy, but that is not how it turned out. We have had only one multilateral treaty since the WTO was created, the 2017 trade facilitation agreement.
There is a hierarchy of agreements that we can secure in terms of liberalisation. A multilateral agreement is the best, but given the effective veto that countries have, that is unlikely, and it is very unlikely to give us the benefits that we would like to see, especially the liberalisation of trade in services. The next best is a plurilateral agreement, the next best after that is a regional agreement, and then we are down to what some people would unkindly describe as the bargain basement of bilateral FTAs. All those are useful in creating a more liberal global trading environment. However, if China were to seek to join the CPTPP, it would need to commit itself to liberalisation in line with CPTPP requirements, which would require a reduced role for the Chinese state. If anyone who keeps an eye on current affairs thinks that the Chinese state is tending in the direction of a smaller influence, they are watching different news outlets from the ones that I am watching.
China could, of course, seek a bespoke agreement to join the CPTPP, but the UK has already set the precedent by joining on current terms. Even if China could join the CPTPP, could it be trusted to meet any of the conditions of accession? Although Chinese leaders have
declared their willingness to meet the conditions, many countries are extremely sceptical, given China’s behaviour as a WTO member. China has a poor record when it comes to complying with WTO rules and observing the fundamental principles of non-discrimination, openness, reciprocity, fairness and transparency on which the WTO agreements are based. China’s subsidies over capacity, intellectual property theft and protectionist non-market policies exacerbate distortions in the global economy, and—even more worryingly—China’s use of trade as a tool of coercive diplomacy has raised concerns further, especially given its behaviour towards Australia and Japan. This is not the sort of partner we should be wishing to join us in the CPTPP, unless there are previously unimagined changes in behaviour.
Finally, a word, if I may, beyond this Chamber to our US colleagues: I believe that the decision to leave the CPTPP by the United States was a mistake. It removed from United States policymakers a tool in its strategic ability to shape events in the region. UK accession provides an opportunity for the United States to seek to join this new grouping and gain greater direct influence over China trade relations with the fastest growing economic zone in the world. These are all reasons why we must keep a very close eye on what happens with China and our new membership of the CPTPP. We have gained a great deal; we cannot afford to have it thrown away, by ourselves or by others.