It is always a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne).
I rise to echo the comments made so eloquently and clearly by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), and to add just a few comments of my own. I have always been in favour of the CPTPP, and, as I said from the Front Bench in 2019,
“It is absolutely essential, particularly given the rise of protectionism globally, that we commit ourselves to a rules-based system based on the WTO. Of course, we have abilities to augment that by other regional relationships, which is why we have had the public consultation and the debate in Parliament about the potential accession to the CPTPP”.—[Official Report, 6 June 2019; Vol. 661, c. 250.]
I have also always believed that the benefits of the CPTPP have been at least as much about geopolitics as about simple import and export numbers. As the Royal United Services Institute put it,
“Joining the CPTPP provides the UK with not just economic benefits, but the means to help define and defend a rules-based order in the face of China’s diplomatic and economic heft.”
At a time of tense relations between China and the United States, the United Kingdom has joined a trade agreement in which neither is present, although the United States was instrumental in its creation—a point to which I shall return later.
The March 2023 integrated review refresh describes the Indo-Pacific as
“critical to the UK’s economy, security and our interest in an open and stable international order. Developments there will have disproportionate influence on the global economy, supply chains”
—that was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill—
“strategic stability and norms of state behaviour.”
The CPTPP, in turn, is about a contribution to the stability of the global trade and investment system.
Within that debate, what do we perceive China’s security threat to the UK to be? In their reply to a report from the Intelligence and Security Committee, in a section entitled “The Strategic Context”, the Government stated:
“China almost certainly maintains the largest state intelligence apparatus in the world. The nature and scale of the Chinese Intelligence Services are—like many aspects of China’s government—hard to grasp for the outsider, due to the size of the bureaucracy, the blurring of lines of accountability between party and state officials, a partially decentralised system, and a lack of verifiable information.”
They also stated:
“The Chinese Intelligence Services target the UK and its overseas interests prolifically and aggressively. While they seek to obtain classified information, they are willing to utilise intelligence officers and agents to collect open source information indiscriminately—given the vast resources at their disposal…To compound the problem, it is not just the Chinese Intelligence Services: the Chinese Communist Party co-opts every state institution, company and citizen. This ‘whole-of-state’ approach means China can aggressively target the UK”
—and UK interests, wherever those interests are globally. Sadly, we have discovered that to our cost in many of our governmental institutions here.
The question, given all that, is this: could China actually be admitted to the CPTPP, and if it is theoretically possible, how likely is it? I think it instructive to look first at the experience of the World Trade Organisation, a brief that my right hon. Friend the Minister and I shared over several years of my extremely enjoyable time working with him at the Department for International Trade.
When China acceded to the WTO in 2001, the west saw it as promising and promoting economic and political reform. It was a time of great optimism that the Chinese communist system could be pulled in a direction that would be advantageous to, and in the interests of, the west. However, Jiang Zemin, the Chinese leader at the time, claimed that the motive of the United States in all this was to
“westernise and divide socialist countries”.
Thus the WTO itself was heading for a stalemate in its direction of travel almost from the point at which China acceded to it.
This has added to other WTO problems—and I mention that because we need to look at the CPTPP within the wider trading framework. The WTO’s problems have been compounded by its adoption of the concept of unanimity, while its rules talk about consensus. If consensus and unanimity meant the same thing, there would not be two different words for it in the founding documents. This has meant that virtually any country in the WTO now exercises a right of veto, which has prevented us from moving forward in what we perceived to be a process of genuine liberalisation of global trade.