My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. I think I have said outside the Chamber that, when it comes to the passage of statute, the principle of “less is more” is not only fundamentally Conservative, but fundamental to good lawmaking. Although the Bill does not weigh in at a heavy number of clauses—it has a mere 10—we as parliamentarians have a continuing duty to demonstrate economy. Any clause—in this case, clause 1—that is titled “Introduction” should give us all pause for thought, if not breaking out into a cold sweat.
It seems to me that the language in clauses 1 to 6 would belong better in a White Paper or an accompanying policy document. We know what the purpose of the Bill is. We have read the treaty, and most of us will have read
the policy document that accompanied the Bill’s publication—that is where such language belongs, not in a Bill. That is not just because I have a tidy and ordered mind—well, I try—but because of the very point made by my right hon. and learned Friend: the more words we put into legislation, the more opportunity we give for their litigation and justiciability, and the arguments that will then go before the court about fundamental issues at a high level that, in my view, really should not be the province of litigation.
It is for the contracting parties to a treaty to agree its terms and sign the document, and then either directly, as in the case of Rwanda or, in our dualist system, via the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—the CRaG procedure that is ongoing—the treaty will come into force. So, to use one of my favourite wartime adages, I must ask my hon. and learned Friend the Minister, for whom I have great esteem: why is our journey really necessary?
In my view, clause 1 needs to go, save for the retention of clause 5. Although we will have a stand-part vote anyway, I tabled amendment 27 just to emphasise my extreme distaste for clause 1. It is a distaste based on the fear that this somehow becomes the norm and we start to see legislation of this nature proliferate. Let us start with clause 2, because that is what the Bill is all about: the safety of the Republic of Rwanda. That is where it should begin. What clause 2 says is clear, and I spoke to it yesterday.
I turn now to clause 3, which throws up a series of interesting questions. I am not a particular fan of section 3 of the Human Rights Act, because I never liked the read-down provisions, which draw the justices—the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in particular—into a province where they are acting almost as a constitutional court. We have seen it happen: the read-down provisions where judges in effect pass and reinterpret the will of Parliament. It is a sticky and dangerous place for the Court to go, and I do not like it. If I had had the opportunity and we had done what we said we would do in the manifesto, which I helped to write, we would have updated the Human Rights Act by now. We could have got rid of section 3, so we would not have needed to refer to it in this ad hoc way in the Bill. It was a horrible echo of that Bill of Rights, which happily never saw the light of day—it did not even have a Second Reading, thank goodness—and perhaps some of what I am saying in the context of these amendments and the stand part debates is an echo of my deep distaste for aspects of that failed legislation.
Why have we got clause 3 in the Bill? I can see what the Government want to do—they want to avoid arguments relating to the Human Rights Act—but I am afraid that they cannot get out of jail. As people have an individual right to petition to Strasbourg anyway—I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) that we helped to set up that Court and have direct ownership of it—we are in effect sending the arguments to that so-called foreign Court. Of course, the danger in allowing petitions to go to Strasbourg without any airing of the arguments in domestic courts is that we do not really get that margin of appreciation evidence that is so crucial for the Strasbourg Court.
I do get frustrated by inelegant, inaccurate comparisons between the Luxembourg Court—the Court of Justice of the European Union—and the Strasbourg Court,
which is a very different place. We have a much wider margin of appreciation, much bigger discretion and much more room in which to make arguments of interpretation and context—indeed, political context as well—about the way in which we do things in this country. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the number of times the United Kingdom is found to be in breach of the convention is vanishingly small.
We have heard about prisoner rights—more cases, anybody? We might remember the Abu Qatada case, which is on all fours with what we are dealing with here. We solved the problem by making sure that Jordan had a fair trial system. If I am right, I think Abu Qatada was tried and acquitted in Jordan, but the point was made. That is the point on all fours with this Bill: if we are to rely on the processes of another country, getting them right in order to be compliant seems to be the best way forward. That is why the Government’s treaty approach is to be commended. So, no, I do not see the need for clause 3—get rid of it. We will end up with these arguments whether we like it or not.
I turn to clause 5, which is another clause that, in the words of my hon. Friends, is just unnecessary. I do not see how interim measures equate in any way to the binding nature of final judgments, which article 46 of the convention draws us to, or indeed anything different from the approach that we take to interim injunctions in domestic cases that High Court judges, county court judges—judges of all shapes and sizes—will be enjoined to create or refuse on ex parte or inter partes applications.
In the context of the debate about interim measures, it is important to pray in aid the work done in the plenary sessions of the European Court of Human Rights last year. The rules will be changed, with that coming into effect in 2024. May I ask my hon. and learned Friend the Minister to work with colleagues in the Attorney General’s Office—his former Department—and indeed the Lord Chancellor, to ensure that the Council of Europe and the plenary sessions of the Court get on with implementing these changes? The changes to interim measures are really important.
First, the limiting of the granting of interim measures to “exceptional circumstances”—those words do not currently exist in the definition of rule 39—will change the ball game at a stroke. Secondly, there is the end to anonymity for judges, which is a proposal that will be enacted. Finally, and importantly, there is the opportunity for parties to the proceedings to request the court to reconsider its decision. So the United Kingdom will have an opportunity to say, “No, there is no imminent risk of irreparable damage here. We can fly people back from Rwanda if there is a problem.” In any event, because of the measures that we are taking in the Bill, we will not be sending people who are vulnerable or at risk—those who might be terminally ill, pregnant or have some serious condition, whatever it might be—to Rwanda in the first place. We have got the arguments to deal with rule 39 and we should have the self-confidence and the ability to make our case. I think that the reforms to rule 39 will be significant.
I am delighted to have followed the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), who made a thoughtful contribution. He and I have had some differences of opinion about things in recent days, but he always couches his arguments in a respectful way, and for that I thank him.