Let me start by saying how much I support the objectives of the Bill. I pay tribute to the Government for the very significant improvements on the status quo that the Bill represents. There are, of course, some practical issues with its operation, which have been well rehearsed on this side of the House.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) said so well earlier, what really matters is whether the Bill will work, and what working looks like is being able to detain and remove sufficient numbers of illegal migrants quickly enough that they decide that the journey across the channel is not worth it. That means ensuring that we have the capacity in the system. I recognise the progress that the Government have made to improve capacity but, as my right hon. Friend says, we have significant concerns about the system getting gummed up with legal claims that are still allowable under the Bill. We are also concerned about the potential continued operation of rule 39 orders from the Strasbourg Court.
The practical problems with the Bill, which are real and need to be addressed in its further stages, derive from a fundamental point of principle. I really do welcome the noises made in the Bill that would gladden the heart of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash)—it is rather like playing Bill Cash bingo: there is “notwithstanding” this, “supremacy” that, and “sovereignty” the other, which is all extremely welcome. Nevertheless, these words do not apply in the crucial places. The Bill still rests the right of individual claims on international law, the case law of the European Court and the operations of the ECHR in our own country.
Let me say quickly that I am not, at this stage, arguing that we should depart from the ECHR, although I think we could do that. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) spoke as if our leaving the ECHR would mean departing from the honourable and ancient British tradition of liberty, but as he implied in his speech, we would be returning to it if we were to leave the ECHR and rest our liberties on the statutes of Parliament and the common law of our
courts. Nevertheless, if the European Court were to disagree with the actions of the Government and issue a substantive ruling to that effect, we would begin a conversation with it about that and decide how exactly we might comply or, if we had to, depart.
Let me turn to the Supreme Court judgment from last month, because it is very important that we try to analyse the implications of that ruling. It is true, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stone said, that the Supreme Court ruling explicitly acknowledges that UK law is supreme over international law. In one of the cases it considered, it made that point in principle, but, except in that one case, it does not make it in practice. The Court ruled against the Government on grounds that derive from European and international law, as well as other domestic laws.
The Court suggested that, in practice, international law trumps domestic law. Having done that, it then inserted itself into foreign policy—it presumed its right to judge a foreign Government. It said it would decide for itself whether the Rwandan Government’s undertakings could be relied upon. The Court essentially gave itself special investigatory powers to make judgments about another country. It described, rather patronisingly, the inadequacy of the Rwandan system—as if that is any business of a British court. While it totally disregarded the UK Government—it said
“the executive enjoys no constitutional prerogative”
in that regard—it gave what it called “particular importance” to the opinion of a United Nations agency. So it inserts itself into foreign policy and draws down the authority of international law and global agencies, but where in its understanding is the role of the UK Government? Where is its understanding of the role of this place, Parliament, which sets our laws?
I want on reflect briefly on what “the rule of law” means, because the phrase is invoked constantly by critics of the Bill and of our Rwanda policy as if international law trumps domestic law. It is not the case that the rule of law implies some hierarchy of law ascending from parish council and local byelaws up to the global law. The rule of law means the supremacy of Parliament and the operation of the common law—case law made by our courts. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone cited all the distinguished jurists: Hoffmann, Bingham and Denning. He did not mention Hale, but he did mention Reed, the President of the Supreme Court. International law is of course important, and I totally recognise its enormous value in keeping the peace in the world and enabling us to deal with other countries, but it applies to the international plane.
Let me touch briefly on human rights law, which has been mentioned. There is an assumption that the Human Rights Act has some kind of superior status in our law. That is often seen to be the case, but that is problematic. The rights and liberties of individuals—citizens and foreign nationals, whether here legally or illegally—are properly protected by statute and case law.
I regret that we have an unsatisfactory Bill before us. I cannot undertake to support it tonight. I hope that the Government will agree to pull the Bill and allow us to work with them and colleagues across the House to produce a better Bill; one that respects parliamentary sovereignty and satisfies the legitimate concerns of colleagues about vulnerable individuals. For instance,
we can do better on safe and legal routes. We should be working together with other countries to design a system that respects the sovereignty of Parliament and the legitimate rule of independent nations.
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