I pay tribute to the Minister for his opening remarks and join him in paying tribute to the valiant work that our armed forces do. He gave us a tour de force of where we are represented around Europe and around the world, doing more than our fair share of making sure that we can sleep well at night, that our backs are covered and that we can stand up to the growing threats we face. I do not want to diminish his speech, but he could have just stood up and said, “We are busy, and we are getting busier,” because by any measure our world is getting more dangerous and more complex.
Globalisation, by which I mean international co-operation and the interdependence of the world’s economies, cultures and populations, is slowly dying. After the end of the cold war, Britain arguably embraced that concept of globalisation more than any other nation. As nations actively retreat, pushed forward by covid, becoming more siloed and protectionist and introducing more isolationist policies to reduce exposure and increase economic resilience, Britain’s economy and security are increasingly exposed.
When global security deteriorates, our economy suffers, as has been so blatantly illustrated by Ukraine and the price of oil and gas and food. It is baffling to hear the Treasury continue to say, “Yes, we will spend 2.5% on defence when economic conditions improve,” not realising the obvious connection that our economy and international security are directly related. Half our GDP is affected by international headwinds. We need to invest now to protect our economy and to allow our economy to grow.
Such is the deteriorating threat picture that the Government had to commission an update of the defence and security policy—the “Integrated Review Refresh”, as it was called. The Prime Minister’s opening paragraph said it is
“recognised that the intensification of competition between states was sowing seeds of instability.”
Paragraph 8 of the refresh stated:
“There is a growing prospect that the international security environment will further deteriorate in the coming years, with state threats increasing and diversifying in Europe and beyond. The risk of escalation is greater than at any time in decades”.
I have never seen such strong language in a Government paper before. It gives a clear warning that we are in for a bumpy decade. I therefore pose the question: why are we still stuck with a peacetime defence budget of just 2%? That is having a consequential impact on all three services.
At the time of the Gulf war in 1990, the Royal Navy had 51 frigates and destroyers and today it has just 18; the RAF had 36 fast jet squadrons and today it has just seven; and the British Army could muster three armoured divisions in Germany alone and one here in the UK. Today, we would struggle to put together one. It is not just the size of the armed forces that has diminished; the last defence review introduced ruthless cuts to equipment. The main battle tank is now reduced to just 156 and is three decades old, and upgrades will not be completed until the next decade. The armoured fighting vehicle, the Warrior, is also decades old, and it was replaced by a wheeled vehicle without a turret. The 8-tonne recce vehicle that was brought into service in 1971 was replaced by the massive 43-tonne Ajax, which should have entered service in 2017, but a dire procurement process means it is still struggling to get sign-off.
It is a grim state of affairs when our armed forces are not shaped to meet the threats, but trimmed to meet the budget. I appreciate that I am not speaking to the right Ministers here, because they understand this. It is the Treasury that needs to appreciate this, and I think we should pay tribute to the work that I know Defence Ministers are doing behind the scenes to make the case that we need to upgrade our defence posture, because the consequence of not doing so is the cuts we have seen.
The Type 32 frigate programme has been dropped completely, the E-7 ISTAR—intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—plane has been reduced from five to three platforms, the Hawk training aircraft has been cut completely, the Typhoon fleet has been reduced, and even the plans to introduce the promised 138 F-35s have stalled at just 78. The Hercules transport aircraft, which is absolutely imperative for special forces operations, has been cut in its entirety. However, the real kick in the teeth is the armed forces’ manpower, which has been reduced from 82,000 to 72,000, while our land warfare capabilities have been severely reduced by the reductions in tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and artillery systems.
Sadly, we are neither ready for war, nor any longer able to project a viable conventional deterrent to maintain the peace. The Navy and the RAF have to some extent regrouped with investment and upgrades in response to the changing character of conflict, but the British Army
has been left behind, without a clear narrative as to what it should be training for, how it should fight and, indeed, the force structure it should adopt.