I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Danny Kruger) for raising those points. The amendments make the case that any harassment must be directed to the employee; it cannot simply be third-party conversations that are overheard. To his specific point, all the conditions must be met for the amendment to be triggered. I recognise that he says that that is a high bar, but that is the case.
Turning to my hon. Friend’s examples, such as whether banter will be banned, I gently say that if it is directed at the employee, that can be sexual harassment. One person’s banter is another person’s harassment, and we need to be mindful of that. The other example that he gave was of a footballer: if the crowd are singing a song or directing a chant, that can be targeted harassment. We have multiple examples of footballers being targeted either because of their race or their colour. That is not acceptable and football clubs take action on that now.
As the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) said, guidance will be issued. We understand that it will be difficult for employers and we know that they need clarity. That is why we have tabled these amendments today. Third-party conversations that are not directed at an employee will be exempt, as is the case if all the conditions in the amendment are met. Direct harassment of an employee, whether that is banter or a song at a football match, is still harassment. That is why we need the Bill.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Amendments made: 2, page 1, line 2, leave out “of the Equality Act 2010”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendments 3 and 4.
Amendment 3 , page 1, line 11, at end insert—
“(1C) Subsection (1D) applies if and so far as—
(a) a third party harasses B in the course of B’s employment,
(b) the harassment falls within section 26(1) (unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic) and not within section 26(2) or (3) (unwanted conduct of a sexual nature etc),
(c) the conduct constituting the harassment involves a conversation in which B is not a participant, or a speech which is not aimed specifically at B,
(d) the conversation or speech involves the expression of an opinion on a political, moral, religious or social matter,
(e) the opinion expressed is not indecent or grossly offensive, and
(f) the expression of the opinion does not have the purpose of violating B’s dignity or of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.
(1D) For the purposes of subsection (1A)(b), A is not to be treated as having failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the harassment solely because A did not seek to prevent the expression of the opinion.”
This amendment makes provision about when an employer can be held liable for the harassment of their employee by a third party. Its effect is that, where relevant conditions are met, employers will not be expected to prevent the expression of opinions in order to avoid liability.
Amendment 4, page 1, line 11, at end insert—
“(2) In section 109 (liability of employers and principals), after subsection (4) insert—
‘(4A) Subsection (4B) applies if and so far as—
(a) A harasses another employee (C) in the course of C’s employment,
(b) the harassment falls within section 26(1) (unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic) and not within section 26(2) or (3) (unwanted conduct of a sexual nature etc),
(c) the conduct constituting the harassment involves a conversation in which C is not a participant, or a speech which is not aimed specifically at C,
(d) the conversation or speech involves the expression of an opinion on a political, moral, religious or social matter,
(e) the opinion expressed is not indecent or grossly offensive, and
(f) the expression of the opinion does not have the purpose of violating C’s dignity or of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for C.
(4B) For the purposes of the defence in subsection (4), B is not to be treated as having failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the harassment solely because B did not seek to prevent the expression of the opinion.’”—(Wera Hobhouse.)
This amendment makes provision about when an employer can be held liable for the harassment of their employee by another employee. Its effect is that, where relevant conditions are met, employers will not be expected to prevent the expression of opinions in order to avoid liability.
Third Reading
12.19 pm