I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. Actually, I will come to that later in my speech.
Provided that the relevant formal procedures are completed, including securing consent from a statutory minimum threshold of members, a demutualisation cannot be stopped. That threshold has been changed from time to time for different types of mutual societies to make demutualisation less likely, but those measures provide only partial protection. There is currently no statutory mechanism for ensuring that surpluses, which previous generations never intended to be a private reward for anybody, remain committed to that wider public purpose.
At the moment, legislation governing mutuals can incentivise demutualisation by permitting those legacy assets to be distributed. Legacy assets have often been built up over many generations of membership and can constitute a significant part of the working capital of the business. Current members typically have not contributed to that capital base but have enjoyed the benefits of previous years of successful trading. Most demutualisation attempts succeed, assisted by a significant power imbalance between the boards of mutuals and members.
The example of Liverpool Victoria last year shows that demutualisation attempts can, however, be defeated, even when proposed by a mutual’s board. We should be wary of the interests that private equity is showing in mutuals across the world, attracted by the prospect of acquiring significant assets built up by generations of members. At present, it is not possible for an existing society, or those setting up a new society, to proscribe demutualisation. That leaves mutuals vulnerable to those simply aiming to liberate those legacy assets, sharing them out among people as they choose, and converting the business into an investor-owned company. That has resulted in much of the UK building society sector being lost and their businesses either failing or transferring to non-UK ownership. That has been bad for mutuality and bad for the economy, given the damage that it has caused to corporate diversity.
Demutualised former building societies were mostly absorbed into banks that failed during the financial crisis. None of the demutualised former building societies continued for long as an independent bank. They became part of larger listed banking groups or, in the cases of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley, failed in the financial crisis and were later nationalised. Moreover, those demutualisations converted some of the largest building societies at the time. The argument for demutualisation has proved to be bogus. It has not delivered the strong independent businesses that it was supposed to do, and the need for more capital is soon forgotten as the newly proprietary entities are generally merged into larger firms.
Diversity of ownership types and business models creates a corresponding diversity in forms of corporate governance, risk appetite and management, incentive structures, policies and practices, and corporate behaviours and outcomes. It also offers a wider choice for consumers and enhances competition that derives in part from the juxtaposition of different business models.
Legislation is needed to help UK mutuals to preserve their legacy for the purposes for which they were intended, to maintain and encourage greater corporate diversity, and to build a more resilient economy. Mutuals need to be able to incorporate appropriate measures into their constitutions which have a statutory basis, either at the point of establishment or thereafter, with an appropriate level of member approval. This will be even more important if the legislative reforms for co-operative and community benefit societies explained above are taken forward. To optimise the successful implementation of new legislation, properly recognising legacy assets for the benefits they bring will be an important ingredient for building confidence.
Many jurisdictions have acted to preserve mutual ownership by ensuring that assets are used only for the purpose for which they were intended. That ensures they cannot be distributed to members or third parties, and thus disincentivises demutualisation. Mergers, dissolutions and transfers of business are still permitted, so this arrangement does not hamper the evolution of business in any way. Ideally, such measures will be universal, but in some legal traditions that is considered problematic as it arguably alters members’ ownership right retrospectively. It is not desirable to cut and paste legislation between different traditions, so solutions are required that respect the culture of different legal frameworks. To deal with that, simple legislation can be introduced in common law jurisdictions that would give every mutual the right to choose a constitution that preserves legacy assets for the purpose they were intended.
My Bill does that. My Bill disincentivises the raiding of legacy assets. Voluntary legislation will ensure that legacy assets are preserved for the purpose for which they were intended. It empowers mutual members to decide what should happen to assets on a solvent dissolution. It would match the best legislation that exists in many other countries. My Bill also: introduces a voluntary power to enable a mutual to choose a constitutional change, so that its legacy assets would be non-distributable; details precisely the destination of any capital surplus on a solvent winding up; outlines the procedures necessary to include such provisions in a mutual’s rules; and inserts a statutory provision for the relevant rules to be unalterable. My Bill will define the
capital surplus as the amount remaining after deducting a mutual’s total liabilities from its assets, including repayment of members’ capital.