The hon. Lady makes a fair point. Those of us who have served as Ministers know that, frankly, all Governments use Henry VIII powers. We all tend to criticise them when we are in opposition and use them a bit when we are in government, if the truth be known. But the reality is that there are Henry VIII powers and Henry VIII powers; and this is Henry VIII, the six wives, Cardinal Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell all thrown in together, as far as I can see. The powers are almost Shakespearean or Wagnerian in their scope and breadth. That is the problem, and it is why we need some greater hold on how they are used.
The hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) raised another important point. Very wide Henry VIII powers have been criticised by the Hansard Society and in the other place—and for good reason, because part of the whole objective of what we have done is recent years has been to restore parliamentary sovereignty. The danger is that that becomes restoring power to the Executive, rather than to Parliament. I say to my hon. Friends on the Conservative Benches, we all know that Governments come and go, and once we set a precedent that gives sweeping powers to a Government with whom we may happen to agree, inevitably—as night follows day—there will be a day when a Government with whom we do not agree come in and use those powers in a way to which we might wish to object; it is better not to set too wide a precedent, anyway.
There is another difficulty with the powers. Clause 15 gives Ministers powers to add to excluded provisions. Not only is that extremely wide, but the clause refers to excluded provisions for “a permitted purpose”, without any further definition. In other respects, there is a test where the Minister may take any such measures in relation to the protocol as the Minister “considers appropriate”. That is an extraordinarily low test. Essentially, it lacks any kind of objectivity; it is a purely subjective test. Giving Ministers delegated powers to act in a purely subjective manner without requiring them to demonstrate the evidential basis on which they exercise those powers is a dangerous and difficult precedent to set.
In fairness, this Bill could not have been foreseen, but therefore could not be put in my party’s manifesto for the general election. It will be interesting to see—I know Ministers are well aware of this point—precisely what view the other place, which is anxious to examine the extent of delegated powers, takes on the matter. It might therefore be in the Government’s interest to progress the Bill to think about ways in which we can get a better balance, and ensure that there is a proper and proportionate hold on the powers.
I have covered the essence of what I needed to say. It comes down to whether the Government have a case—without going into the rest of the legal argument, I concede that they might be able to make that case—and whether that case might have grounds in law. I would say to my clients in the old days, “Just because it’s lawful doesn’t mean it’s a wise thing to do; just because you’ve got a case that you might argue, it might not necessarily be a good idea for you to go and argue it.” Sometimes litigation is best avoided and sometimes sweeping legislation is best avoided, if it is possible to find a better route.
It seems to me that if need be, it would not be unreasonable for the Government to come back to the House and make their case in relation to the specific items where they seek to disapply an international treaty. If they have a good enough case, the House will support them and they can get on with it; it can be done quickly and need not cause undue delay. That would at least ensure that we have acted within a reasonable and proportionate legal framework. At the same time, we could demonstrate that we are seeking, in good faith, to renegotiate. If we cannot do that, I suggest it would be prudent at the very least to invoke the article 16 safeguard provisions, either before or perhaps in parallel with those matters; we could show again that we have acted in good faith to do all that we could within the framework that exists, which is one of the important parts of a necessity test.
I hope that the Government will take on board those arguments, because they are pretty fundamental to the Bill itself and would not obstruct the objectives of the Bill—that is, getting the protocol changed or getting devolved government working in Northern Ireland, both of which we wish to see—but would enable them in a proportionate and constitutionally sound manner.