That is, of course, the fourth limb of the five-limb tests—that an essential interest of the EU member states should not be imperilled. I have to say that I do not think an essential interest is imperilled by this Bill, because it is clear that the risk of leakage into the EU single market has been minimal, even with the way the protocol is operating—or partially operating—now. That is probably the strongest ground that the Government have. But there is then the argument as to whether the party that invokes the doctrine of necessity has in some way contributed to the situation. I think that is more finely balanced, in fairness. I have seen the briefing from the Bingham Centre that suggests that that test is not met either. I am more prepared to give the Government some slack in that regard, but we need the evidence for that as well. After all, at the end of the day, the Government agreed the protocol—not long ago, in 2020—and did so on the basis of intending to operate it in good faith. That, of course, is a rather important reputation that this country has. My right hon. Friend is right to flag up those stages, but even before we get to them, I am not at all sure that we yet have the evidence before the House to justify the provision.
2.30 pm
Let me return to the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) about why the amendment is necessary. As it stands, the Bill, as well as potentially setting up the risk of a breach of international obligation by directly disapplying certain areas of the protocol immediately, gives Ministers wide powers to go further than that, and effectively to create new law and change legislation through what has been described as one of the grandmothers of all Henry VIII clauses. Those are exceptionally wide delegated powers. I mentioned the potential reputational risk of unilaterally departing from an international agreement that we have entered into in good faith, without the most compelling grounds. That is not something, in my respectful submission to the Committee, that should be left to Ministers acting under delegated powers.
The consequence is of such importance that the decision should come back to the House, and that need not take long; my amendment 2 to clause 26 sets out the procedure, which would mean the process could be dealt with swiftly, by Ministers coming to the House, laying a motion to approve the relevant matters and setting out their case. If the case were made out, I would happily vote for it. If we had evidence that political stability and a functioning Executive would return to Northern Ireland—that great objective—that might persuade me, and many others, no doubt, to take a greater risk than might otherwise be the case, but as yet we do not have the evidence that that would happen, so at the moment we are in danger of giving Ministers a significant blank cheque on a matter that relates to our political and legal reputational standing in the world. That is my objection to the Bill in its current form. I do not rule out the possibility of the Government using the Bill, but they should come back to the House and make their case. That is the essence of my argument.