UK Parliament / Open data

Sanctions

Proceeding contribution from David Lammy (Labour) in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 22 February 2022. It occurred during Debates on delegated legislation on Sanctions.

My hon. Friend has put it very well indeed. We must not fall into the trap of the past in taking actions that are too limited and too late, so Labour will continue to make the case for a fuller and more comprehensive package of sanctions now. President Biden is expected to announce, as soon as today, measures which will go further than those outlined by the Prime Minister. There are also reports that the EU is close to agreeing a package of measures including the targeting of more than 300 Russian Government officials and new restrictions on trading in Russian state bonds. Can the Minister reassure us that we will move in lockstep with our international allies?

Let me now turn to the actual text of the legislation. Although the Opposition of course welcome the spirit of what the legislation is seeking to achieve, we have some major concerns, and some suggestions as to how the Government could go further.

Concerns have been expressed to us that, given how the legislation is currently drafted, oligarchs who are close to Putin will find it too easy to avoid the impact of the measures. Although they may not hold a formal role in a sanctioned bank or company, they may exert significant control behind the scenes. Consequently, some of the most influential and notorious oligarchs—oligarchs who are close to Vladimir Putin, and have purposely structured their enterprises to avoid the appearance of majority ownership and control—would go untouched.

We believe that that is a crucial mistake. We know that Putin could not care less about sanctions laid against his country or the Russian people; that is one of the reasons why sanctions failed after the invasion of Crimea. The only sanctions that he really cares about are those against the richest people closest to him, and that must be the Government’s target. It would be a grave error to provide any loophole that would allow these people to escape sanction.

The Government could easily close that loophole by including a new category of person in the legislation which would encompass any oligarch close to Putin who obtains a benefit from, and supports, the Government of Russia. These designations should be made without fear or favour, and should include individuals with UK interests or even UK passports. In the same way, some of the oligarchs closest to Putin could currently slip through the net cast by this legislation, and so can Russian Government officials who have supported Putin’s regime and its goals. As it stands, paragraph 4 of the legislation would allow sanctions to be laid against individuals on the board of companies with certain links to the Russian Government but it would not enable sanctions to be laid against officials who enable the Russian Government to pursue their policy of aggression in Ukraine. The EU appears to be moving quickly on this, and this Government must keep pace.

It is not just Russian officials who could escape the pain of these sanctions, but also members of the Russian legislature. Paragraph 7 of the legislation defines what is meant by the “Government of Russia”, but it does not include members of Russia’s legislative branch, the Federal Assembly. This seems to be a remarkable oversight, and I would be glad to hear from the Minister what the rationale was for not including members of the Russian legislature in the scope of the instrument. We also have to ask what action the Government are taking to clamp down on assets owned by family members of those subject to sanctions. For example, will the Government also designate businesses that are owned by family members but controlled by a designated person?

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
709 cc259-260 
Session
2021-22
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
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