I thank my right hon. Friend for the point that he has made, and I will go into a bit more detail about the framework within which we can operate. He will understand that the Government choose not to discuss any future sanctions we may impose, to prevent
either the movement of moneys or other things that we might approach, but my colleagues in Government and I absolutely hear the point that he has made.
Our sanctions regime is the foundation for an independent sanctions policy in support of our foreign policy and national security interests. With this framework in place, the UK can use sanctions to act as a force for good in the world. Working with partners both old and new, we can collaborate to project our values and tackle unacceptable behaviour wherever we find it. Our global human rights regime is just one example of this. Of course, where collaboration is not possible or where swift leadership is required, we now have the freedom to act, as we did with Belarus and, most recently, in relation to Zimbabwe. On Monday, we designated four security sector chiefs who were responsible for the worst humanitarian rights violations committed against the people of Zimbabwe since President Mnangagwa took power, including the deaths of 23 protesters. Our sanctions send a clear message that those responsible for such acts will be held to account.
In order to establish individual sanctions regimes within the framework of the sanctions Act, we are required to lay statutory instruments. Among other things, these instruments set out the purpose of the regime, the criteria for designation, the measures imposed, exceptions and licensing arrangements, and the offences and penalties for contravention of these measures.
Of the nine instruments we are considering today, seven transition existing EU regimes into UK law. The UK is at the forefront of developing multilateral contributions on sanctions and has played a large part in shaping the EU’s approach. As a result, the measures contained in the UK sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, are intended to have substantially the same policy effect as those in the regimes that they replace.
Certain types of sanctions measures, such as asset freezes and travel bans, apply to those who we designate. The instruments themselves do not specify which individuals or entities will be designated. Designations are instead made through an administrative process and published on the UK’s sanction list. Officials assessed all those designated under the EU regimes against the test established in the sanctions Act and UK policy objectives before the end of the transition period. The vast majority of EU designations met those criteria.
The two remaining instruments amend other statutory instruments that established sanctions regimes. These amendments are designed to ensure that our entire suite of sanctions legislation is as consistent and clear in its provisions as possible. Many regimes contain the same sanctions measures, and consistency in language promotes consistency in interpretation, application and enforcement. British businesses often export goods or provide services to more than one country that is subject to sanctions, and any inconsistency in the wording of legislation can cause confusion and increase their compliance costs. The amendments also ensure that UK persons in the Crown dependencies and overseas territories are not unduly impacted by extraterritorial application of UK law. They create an exemption for the extraterritorial prohibitions so that a licence from the authorities in that jurisdiction is sufficient to authorise a UK person’s conduct there. Those persons do not need also to obtain a licence from the UK authorities in order to avoid committing an offence under UK law.
I will elaborate a little further on the purposes of the seven regimes that these instruments establish. The Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 are aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Bosnia and respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. They are also intended to encourage compliance with, and the implementation of, the general framework agreement for peace, which established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single sovereign state. The regulations permit the imposition of financial and immigration sanctions. Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the countries in the western Balkans most at risk of instability. Its domestic political situation is affected by institutional dysfunctionality, diverse ethno-nationalistic rhetoric, attempts to undermine the functions of the state and its institutions and challenges to the general framework agreement for peace. These sanctions are a public demonstration of our enduring commitment to promoting stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Burundi (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 aim to encourage the Government of Burundi to respect democratic principles and institutions, the rule of law and good governance in Burundi, to participate in negotiations with political opponents in good faith to bring about peaceful solutions to the political situation in Burundi, to refrain from policies and activities that repress civil society in Burundi, to comply with international humanitarian rights and to respect human rights. They permit the imposition of financial and immigration sanctions. Following elections in May 2020, there was a peaceful transfer of power to a new President in June 2020. Nevertheless, we continue to have concerns about the human rights situation, and we believe that these sanctions continue to have a role in promoting respect for human rights in Burundi.
The Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 are aimed at preventing certain types of cyber-activity that undermine the integrity, prosperity or security of the UK or any other country. They are also intended to prevent certain types of cyber-activity that cause economic loss or prejudice commercial interests, undermine the independence or effective functioning of an international organisation or otherwise affect a significant number of people in an indiscriminate manner. The regulations permit the imposition of financial and immigration sanctions. The cyber threat is growing, with attacks increasing in their intensity, complexity and severity. Malign actors in cyber-space are able to carry out attacks on other countries’ critical national infrastructure, democratic institutions, businesses and media. These sanctions demonstrate that there are consequences for such attacks and restrict access to the resources for those who would seek to carry them out.
The Guinea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 aim to encourage the Government of Guinea to properly investigate the violent repression that took place on 28 September 2009 and its aftermath and to hold those responsible to account. These sanctions make clear that these events, in which more than 150 people were killed, have not been forgotten, and that their perpetrators should face justice, as well as providing a deterrent for the future. The regulations permit the imposition of targeted financial and immigration sanctions.
The Misappropriation (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 are aimed at deterring and providing accountability for the misappropriation of state funds from a country
outside the UK. They permit the imposition of financial and immigration sanctions. Rather than establish geographic regimes, as existed under the EU legislation, this statutory instrument creates a single thematic regime under which designations can be made in respect of misappropriation of state funds taking place anywhere outside the UK, allowing for greater agility and flexibility. Corruption, and in particular misappropriation of state funds, has a significant negative effect on national and international prosperity, security and governance. The cost of corruption worldwide is estimated to be more than 2% of global GDP. These sanctions are part of our wider strategy to combat this issue.
The Nicaragua (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 are aimed at encouraging the Government in Nicaragua to respect democratic principles and institutions, the separation of powers and the rule of law; to refrain from the repression of civil society, and to respect human rights. The regulations permit the imposition of financial and immigration sanctions. These sanctions function as a clear signal of our intention to maintain the pressure on the repressive Ortega regime and as a tool through which we can exert this pressure.
The Unauthorised Drilling Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 aim to discourage any unauthorised hydrocarbon exploration or production activities in the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus or on its continental shelf. They permit the imposition of financial and immigration sanctions. We recognise, and have consistently stated our support for, the sovereign right of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit the oil and gas in its internationally agreed exclusive economic zone. Cyprus’s oil and gas should be used for the benefit of Cypriots. These sanctions demonstrate our opposition to unauthorised drilling and the violation of other states’ sovereignty.
Sanctions are a key part of the UK’s foreign policy toolbox, and feature in many of our political and diplomatic strategies. We use them to change unacceptable behaviour by coercing or constraining those involved, or by sending a political signal that their actions will not be tolerated. They also contribute to our efforts to uphold and defend the rules-based international order. The UK has long been a global leader on sanctions, and that will not change now that we have left the European Union. Our independent sanctions policy allows us to use sanctions to achieve maximum impact, working in a way that is agile, expertise-driven and in support of our values, and which enables collaboration with both new and established partners.
International co-operation is at the heart of our polity. Sanctions are most effective when implemented and enforced collectively, and we will continue to co-ordinate closely with our European and other international partners on sanctions. These regulations are a crucial part of the legal edifice that underpins our sanctions policy, of which the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 is a keystone. With them in place, we can promote and protect security, stability and prosperity at home and overseas, call for accountability and justice, and deter human rights violations and abuses. In short, we can project the UK as a force for good in the world. I welcome the opportunity to hear the views of Members about the regulations and to answer their questions. I commend these regulations to the House.
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