I am more than happy to support new clause 4, not least because I have signed it, but it is a slightly different thing. Ensuring parliamentary scrutiny, about which I shall say a little more later, is important, but it is different from the seeking of consent from those Administrations whose policy direction may be affected by a UK Government decision.
When we debated the identical new clause in Committee, the Minister went on to say that
“this proposed new clause would give the devolved Administrations a statutory role in the reserved area of international trade negotiations, which would be constitutionally inappropriate.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2020; c. 241.]
He was partly right, in that it would give the devolved Administrations a statutory role, but only in so far as the provisions of a trade deal affected devolved competences. That is not constitutionally inappropriate; it is a matter of good administration and respect.
The Minister’s key argument against what was proposed was that it was not “practical”. He said:
“It would lock us and the”—
devolved Administrations—
“into prescribed ways of working under the existing intergovernmental memorandum of understanding, a document last updated in 2013.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2020; c. 241.]
Well, that may be an argument for revisiting the MOU, and it might also be an argument to say that the Government should adhere to the terms of the MOU
under any circumstances, but it is a strange argument for opposing this amendment. Surely it is better to base negotiations on an agreed framework, or better still an agreed statutory framework, rather than to leave them to chance, make up the rules on the hoof and give an impression of UK Government acting in an arbitrary way.
The Minister’s key argument was as follows:
“As parts of these agreements touch on devolved matters, this legislation will create concurrent powers. We have sought to put in place concurrent powers to provide greater flexibility in how transitional agreements are implemented”.
So far so good; however, he went on to say:
“This approach permits greater administrative efficiency, reducing the volume of legislation brought through the UK Parliament and through the devolved legislatures.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2020; c. 241.]
It cannot be right that the UK Government intend to legislate, or can legislate, in areas of devolved competence for the sake of administrative efficiency. There are far bigger and wider principles at stake than that.
Let me turn to new clause 7, tabled in my name. We know that trade deals can put pressure on food standards and lead to the importation of low-standard food. For example, the US Administration has made it clear that they want the UK to lower its food and animal welfare standards. The new clause includes a ban on the importation of food that is produced to standards lower than that in the UK. We know that the US and other countries have far lower animal welfare standards and adopt practices—including chlorine-washed chicken, hormone-fed beef and the use of various pesticides and GM crops—that are illegal in the UK for health and environmental reasons. None of that is a great surprise to anyone in the House. We believe that the quality of Scotland’s food and drink produce and, indeed, of food and drink produced elsewhere in the UK, and the related standards, are essential to the maintenance of our established international reputation in those areas.