Does the Foreign Secretary accept that the taking of hostages and the flouting of international law has been the signature strategy of Iran ever since the Islamic revolution in 1979? If he does accept that, was it not entirely predictable—and, indeed, predicted—that by impounding this Iranian ship, however legally justified that was, the consequence would be an attempt to retaliate by grabbing a British vessel? What consideration was given, before the original decision was taken, to the adequacy of the number of ships in the Gulf, either ours or those of our allies? What attempts were made to persuade vessels that had to navigate the strait that they should do so in small convoys, which would at least enable two, or at most three, frigates to protect a larger number of ships? Sailing independently and separately meant that one or more were bound to be seized.
Situation in the Gulf
Proceeding contribution from
Julian Lewis
(Conservative)
in the House of Commons on Monday, 22 July 2019.
It occurred during Ministerial statement on Situation in the Gulf.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
663 c1127 
Session
2017-19
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Librarians' tools
Timestamp
2019-07-28 23:13:40 +0100
URI
http://hansard.intranet.data.parliament.uk/Commons/2019-07-22/19072230000027
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