I think most of our constituents assume that the guarantees that they currently enjoy will continue. They will not know that many of these rights flow from and are underpinned by EU law, but they would expect them to be transposed in a way that would provide the same level of protection rather than the lowest possible legislative status. This is an issue to which we shall have to return, and one that the other place will no doubt tackle.
Amendment 2 seeks to further circumscribe the correcting powers contained in clause 7. Throughout this process, we have been at pains to argue that, to the extent that relatively wide delegated powers in the Bill are necessary, they should not be granted casually, and that when they are granted they should be limited whenever that is possible and practical. It is clear from their tabling of amendments 14 and 15, and consequential amendments, that the Government accept that there are shortcomings in the drafting of clause 7. We welcome the fact that the deficiencies identified in clause 7(2) will now form an exhaustive rather than an illustrative list—with the caveat, I should add, that the further deficiencies can be added at a later date. In effect, the list as drafted will be exhaustive unless Ministers subsequently decide that it is not. That is not perfect, but it does represent some progress.
Nevertheless, even with the incorporation of Government amendments 14 and 15, the correcting powers provided for which clause 7 provides are still too potent and too
widely drawn. Suggestions on day six of the Committee stage that the clause ought to stipulate that the correcting power should be used only when necessary have been ignored, as have concerns that the Bill as drafted does not guarantee that the powers and functions of entities such as the European Commission and other EU agencies will continue to operate with equivalent scope, purpose and effect after exit day. Concerns that the Bill as drafted could be used for a purpose other than that which was intended— specifically, that it has the potential to diminish rights and protections—have likewise been ignored.
On day six, the Government had the chance to justify the drafting of the clause in detail and to address each of those concerns, but they did not do so adequately. They were also given an enormous menu of options, in amendments tabled by Back Benchers in all parties, whereby the powers in the clause—and, indeed, similar powers elsewhere in the Bill—might be constrained. Amendments 14 and 15 represent the totality of their response. As I have said, they are a step in the right direction. but on their own they are not enough. That is why we tabled amendment 2, which addresses comprehensively the range of flaws contained in clause 7 so that the correcting power is reasonably and proportionately circumscribed. If the Government do not indicate that they have taken those concerns on board and are prepared to act on them, we will press the amendment to a vote.
Amendment 1 seeks to ensure that the Bill can facilitate transitional arrangements after 29 March 2019 on the same basic terms as now. The Opposition have argued for some time that we need a time-limited transitional period between our exit from the EU and the future relationship that we build with our European partners. We believe that, to provide maximum certainty and stability, that transitional period should be based on the same basic terms as now. That includes our being in a customs union with the EU and in the single market, both of which will entail the continued jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice for the period that is agreed. Our view is shared widely by businesses and trade unions, but for a long time it was considered to be anathema to the Prime Minister and senior members of her Cabinet.