I have clearly touched a nerve with some of my comments about the Bill, which I am afraid I will not be giving the wholehearted support that some in the House have given it today.
The Government have attempted to portray the Bill as a minor technical matter which should go through on the nod with minimal scrutiny and to which we should all give a big hurrah. What appears to be a minor technical two-clause Bill, however, is in fact far more significant and controversial. As we have heard, it proposes an immediate quadrupling of the limits on taxpayer funding of the CDC and then suggests a further doubling at the whim of the Secretary of State and without further primary legislation.
Now the CDC expansion, which has been significant from 1999 to the present day, has required only £1.5 billion of taxpayers’ money, a large amount of it in the recapitalisation that took place last year. By stark contrast, the Bill will permit an increase of up to £12 billion over an as yet undefined period, although the explanatory notes make it clear that the Secretary of State intends to
“accelerate CDC’s growth over the current Spending Round”.
That could imply giving three times extra to the CDC— £4.5 billion—in three to four years’ time than it has needed in the last 17 years. According to the explanatory notes, this is justified as a response to an as yet undefined or evidenced
“forecast market demand over CDC’s next strategy cycle and in order for the CDC to play a fuller role in the delivery of the UK’s international development objectives.”
Ministers rarely take powers without the intent to use them fully, and the transfer of powers to use secondary legislation should always be subject to robust scrutiny. I will explore in due course whether I believe this Bill,
and the proposed increase for the CDC, meets three key tests. It is not whether it has met its plans as defined in 2012, but whether, first, it has demonstrated enough effectiveness to justify such a huge increase; secondly, whether it ensures an adequate focus on tackling poverty in the poorest countries; and thirdly, whether it acts in a coherent way with respect to the rest of DFID and indeed wider HMG policy.
Let me first suggest my own answer as to why such a huge increase has been proposed, and why now. One of the primary reasons may lie in a little noticed change to the reporting of our aid spending—official development assistance or ODA—last year, which saw the CDC’s contribution to meeting the 0.7% aid target dramatically altered. Until 2015, the investment activities of the CDC could either add to or subtract from our total aid spending. Simply put, we used to look at the net benefit of the CDC to developing countries by subtracting money flowing back to the CDC from the new investments it was making. In fact, this resulted in a positive contribution to our aid spending of £228 million in 2010; £91 million in 2011; £103 million in 2012; £100 million in 2013; and £42 million in 2014.
In 2015, however, there was a significant change. Instead of reporting with the same measure, which incidentally would, according to the House of Commons Library, have resulted in a negative contribution to the aid budget of minus £9 million, DFID changed its reporting so that the capital flow from the UK Government to the CDC is scored as ODA by DFID rather than the CDC scoring its own net disbursements as ODA. Instead of a negative impact on aid last year, the UK reported the capital increase reported to the CDC as aid, which was £450 million—a stark difference. We now looking at the total money DFID puts into the CDC counting as aid, regardless of which country or sector it ends up in, let alone whether it resulted in a net flow of resources to the poorest countries.
Why does this matter and how does it relate to the Bill? It matters because it would allow the Secretary of State to classify the entirety of future capital increases to the CDC as ODA or aid, potentially diverting, and effectively privatising, up to £12 billion of our future aid via the CDC, yet continuing to count it towards the 0.7% target. This is particularly important, given the different focuses and priorities of the CDC. I acknowledge that the differences have narrowed in recent years, and I shall come on to praise the work undertaken by the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) in this area. However, the differences between the CDC and DFID’s objectives, and indeed its stated aims, are still significant, not least over whether our aid is focused on the very poorest countries that most need our support or on higher-income countries where we can more easily achieve quicker and bigger returns on investment. I shall return to this point.