I thank my hon. Friend and fellow Select Committee member for his kind words. I agree: there does need to be more time for reflection on these issues. I would also suggest that we need greater investment in the FCO. We need greater expertise and analytical skills because we need to make sure that we have analysed a
situation correctly. Our system of government performs better when we have a well-informed Executive being questioned by the legislature.
What we have seen is a series of errors through which it has become increasingly evident that the Executive do not have that expertise to hand. That is one reason why the legislature has raised the bar on military intervention—because it has lacked the trust in the Executive to make their case, analyse a situation correctly and make sound recommendations. Once that trust is lost, the legislature will raise the bar when it comes to military intervention, as we have seen.
Let me return to some of the other errors that we have made. I suggest that there were errors in Syria. The Government line that we did not intervene early enough on behalf of the rebels, which accounts for the mess that is evident there now, is simply not correct. The Government’s intention was to arm the rebels in the hope that they could keep the weapons confined to the “good” rebels and not allow them to spread to the “bad” rebels—in other words, to track and trace the weapons. Anybody who knows anything about the region, or who has visited the country or travelled through it, should know that everything is tradeable in the bazaar. Also, given that the situation was so fast moving, the idea that we could have stopped the rebels from falling into the hands of al-Qaeda, al-Nusra or other extremists was pure make-believe.
Then, within a couple of years, the Government, having been stopped by the House from intervening in a key vote in 2013, again proposed to intervene—but against the rebels. I would not be so unkind as to suggest that we swapped sides in a civil war within two years, but to the general public, it damn well nearly looks like that. It well illustrates how we have failed to analyse the situation correctly.
In the brief time left to me, I would argue that in many respects our interventions have been a distraction. I, for one—like many Members on both sides; some are in their places today—have long advocated the need to spend more on defence. The military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and indeed Syria have perhaps distracted us from the greater threat of nation states, not necessarily friendly to the west, re-arming and reasserting their power and influence. One thinks immediately of Russia and China, but there are others as well.
To those who suggest that the straits of Hormuz or the South China seas are far away and of little significance to us, I say that a country based to such an extent on maritime trade—about 90% of our trade comes by sea—would certainly know about it if those straits or seas were ever blocked. My suggestion is that we have been distracted and that that is partly a function of the fact that we are not investing enough in what I call our ears and eyes—in other words, our ability to understand what is happening out there.
We must have a margin of safety or comfort as regards our capability, because no one can confidently predict where the next trouble spot is going to be. History is littered with examples of our facing the wrong way. I suggest that without that margin of comfort, that margin of safety, in our analytical capability, we may well be caught short again if we have not made
the necessary investment. I suggest that, without that investment, we make expensive mistakes—indeed, we have made them—and that it is therefore a false economy to talk about savings, particularly when the budget is so small relative to Government expenditure generally. If I may take the point to the extreme, avoiding unnecessary conflict is vastly cheaper than committing ourselves to conflict that is costly in terms of both lives and treasure.
We often talk about hard power in the House, but perhaps we do not talk enough about soft power, which is increasingly important. In the present information age, those who win the argument will be just as important as those who win the conflict. This is about a battle of ideas, a battle of ideologies. It is about persuading others to want what we want, rather than just rattling the sabre, which—as we have seen so many times in our recent history—can often be counterproductive. We do not attach enough importance to soft power in this country, certainly not when it comes to the making of foreign policy.
There are clear examples of our putting our soft power capability at risk. Past cuts to the BBC World Service have hindered our ability to reach out to people; the World Service budget has been transferred from the FCO’s ambit, but that was one example before the transfer.
An example that currently sits in the FCO is the British Council. That venerable organisation is doing tremendous work in spreading the word, encouraging people to want what we want, providing an educational service, and trying to bring peoples together to improve understanding for the benefit of all concerned, but what are we doing? We are making cuts there. What is the British Council having to do as a result? It is having to become even more commercial in trying to make up for those cuts.
Members may think that a 10% cut is very little, but given that 10% is sometimes the profit margin, the British Council must achieve a 100% increase in its revenue when engaging in commercial activities to make up for that cut. We, as a country, must think again about short-sightedness of that kind, because it is not serving us well—and, I would argue, not serving the international community well.
We need to ensure that our ears and eyes are working, because when they are not, we tend to make expensive mistakes in the world. The fact that we have not properly funded our analytical skills and our capabilities, and have not been as well-sighted as we should have been, has certainly contributed—although it has not been the only reason—to a series of errors that have proved exceedingly costly in lives first and foremost, but also in terms of treasure. That brings me back to the point about false economies. It is a false economy to make cuts in our ears and eyes—our Foreign and Commonwealth Office capabilities—if, as a result, we then blunder into interventions that cost us dearly in lives and treasure.
I am pleased to see that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe is present. Through him, I urge the Government to increase expenditure on the FCO in real terms. We will be better sighted for it, and will make fewer costly errors.
2.34 pm