These amendments relate to part 7, which confers powers on the Secretary of State to establish a body to be known as the privacy and civil liberties board. While most of the Bill introduces new powers, part 7 introduces checks on those powers. It is worth mentioning at this stage that no level of general oversight will ever negate the need for proper judicial oversight of the specific use of these powers, which until yesterday the Government unfortunately were fiercely resisting.
Labour has always said that strong powers need strong checks, which is why we support the principle of a new oversight body. It is also why we tabled amendments to the Justice and Security Bill when it went through Parliament to increase the powers of the Intelligence and Security Committee and why we have consistently called for a bigger role to be given to the intelligence and surveillance commissioners.
Although the creation of a new body is good in principle, what is actually set out in the Bill does not match the name “privacy and civil liberties board” or what the Government set out in their terms of reference, and it does not introduce what we think is needed. That is why we have tabled amendments 2 to 5. The problem is that the Bill determines nothing other than the name of the body. The name evokes the idea of a body with a wide remit to work on privacy and civil liberties issues in the UK, a body to safeguard human rights, a body similar to the Joint Committee on Human Rights created by the Labour Government, but that is not actually what is provided for in the Bill.
The terms of reference published by the Government suggest a body that will support the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in providing oversight of counter-terrorism legislation in the UK and investigating its operations. Broadly, we think that what is contained in the terms of reference is very sensible and that it would provide both capacity and openness to the oversight of counter-terrorism policy. It would also address some of the issues relating to the capacity of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation that the current incumbent, David Anderson QC, identified earlier this year—I went through some of that in detail in Committee.
However, what we see in the terms of reference does not match what we see in the Bill. The third version of the board is the one provided for by clause 36, a body that the Home Secretary may create in future if she wishes. In future she may decide on the body’s procedures,
membership, work plan and the publishing of its reports. If the body is created, it will have very limited statutory remit and powers. We do not think that is good enough, so amendments 2 to 5 address what we see as the Bill’s shortcomings as currently drafted.
Amendment 3 would ensure that the panel or board will have a remit that includes all the key counter-terrorism issues. Specifically, it includes the terrorism statutes, which the independent reviewer is currently precluded from investigating. Unlike the independent reviewer, we do not envisage a remit that is overly prescriptive or requires annual reviews of certain pieces of legislation. Amendment 3 would also give the board a role in undertaking specific inquiries in certain circumstances, to make recommendations to public authorities, to review intelligence-sharing guidance and to encourage good practice in the prevention and investigation of terrorism.
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Amendment 4 would ensure that appointments to the panel were made in line with the code of public appointments and not used as political patronage. We know that the role of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has been so successful because the calibre of the individuals appointed has been outstanding, but this has been possible only because candidates were appointed for their competence rather than their politics, and the same principle should apply to members of the board.
Of course, a board can be effective only if it has a work plan that is agreed with the relevant parties, information-gathering powers and access to the relevant information which, for a board of this type, will often include classified information. All this would be provided for by amendment 5.