This debate covers four of the most complicated, most grave and serious threats to our well-being and security that this
country has faced for a very long time. I congratulate those who spoke before me on their brilliance in covering all four topics in such restricted time. Three quarters of an hour is not really long enough to do so from the Front Bench. I know my limitations; I have strong views on all four, but I propose to confine myself to the problems in Iraq and Syria and to jihadist extremism, which is probably, in a competitive field, the most current and pressing problem and the most dangerous situation that we face at this very moment.
It seems to me that a great deal of attention is being paid, outside the House and in this debate, to whether or not the Government will be supported if they decide to use armed force and take part in the air strikes in which the United States is currently engaged. That is a very important question, but in my opinion it is somewhat putting the cart before the horse to make that the main question. An answer to that question depends on all kinds of other things being satisfied.
I suspect that my view coincides with that of the vast majority here—that we would of course support the use of British armed force if it was essential, unavoidable, in support of some crucial national interest and in pursuit of some well thought out and credible policy objective. We should have learnt in the last 15 years—when on the whole, American and western policy in the entire middle east has been a catastrophe—that leaping into military activity without a well-judged policy, a well-judged diplomacy and a well-judged strategy has contributed to the extraordinary state of anarchy that has now broken out across the region.
Those problems were not caused by our military activity or by our armed forces; they were caused by the disastrous politics of the decision to invade Iraq for rather naive ideological reasons as far as the Americans were concerned, and rather contrived and almost bogus ones as far as the British and some of our allies were concerned. We have not achieved striking success in the odd ventures we have made in the use of military power occasionally in north Africa and the middle east since. Before we use any armed force, we need to know exactly what medium and long-term strategy lies behind the politics of the immediate steps that we are going to take.
One thing I greatly welcome in the Foreign Secretary’s excellent speech was what I thought was his pretty clear undertaking that we would not take part in any military action without a debate and without the approval of Parliament. It is possible to contrive a rather childlike version of our constitutional position and say that the royal prerogative controls the use of military forces. That is very attractive to Governments who are a little uncertain of their majority in the House of Commons when they want to take action.
It is true that if there is a sudden surprise attack on a British possession or on the British military, the Prime Minister can use the royal prerogative to respond instantly, without having to wait to recall Parliament, and to order his troops to defend themselves against whatever the threat may be, but the idea that we work out with our allies a comprehensive policy and strategy and then join in military action in support of it without a pretty convincing vote of approval from the House of Commons would certainly be a political outrage. I think that it would be of very dubious legality too.