This clause is about retention; it is not about access. That distinction is an important one, not least to anybody reading these debates or drawing conclusions from them. It is also something that might profitably have been considered at greater length by the European Court when it reached its judgment.
There is a big difference in the impact on somebody’s human rights between the retention of data and having access to those data, which we will deal with in subsequent clauses. Of course, companies retain data for their own commercial purposes, such as billing and a variety of other reasons. They are constrained by the Data Protection Act—they have to have a legitimate purpose for doing so—but they have many purposes that can enable them to keep data. It is important to recognise that the problem from a human rights and privacy point of view arises when access is made—when a Government body can go into that mine of data and discover a lot of things about somebody’s life. It might have a number of good reasons to do that—to identify whether that person is involved in a serious crime—but those reasons have to be justified before some kind of procedure. We can consider that aspect later, but we must recognise that this part of the Bill is confined to the power of retention.
The Government’s answer to the argument advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) is that, in framing the retention provisions, they will not be obliged to make the same provision for every kind and every aspect of data. That should satisfy the European Court provision. If ever this comes to a legal challenge, I hope that there will be some attempt to make the Court think a little more carefully about the fact that retention and access are not the same thing.
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