My hon. Friend has a point to this extent: for example, the bar that we set in relation to racial hatred is the highest bar of all, and when we came to the incitement of hatred in relation to sexual orientation, a lower bar was set as to the speech that would be allowed. A stronger free-speech threshold was built in, precisely because it was recognised that religious organisations might otherwise have difficulty in expressing their objection to particular attitudes. That in itself is controversial.
I return to the question that I posed. If, in the case of an application to have a wedding, it is wrong for a registrar to turn someone away on the grounds that they are black or a member of an ethnic minority, why would it be right for a registrar to turn away a gay person? That is the essence of the question and that is why new clause 2, in seeking to protect the conscience of that registrar, who is performing a public service, goes too far and opens up the possibility that we would provide all sorts of protections for the exercise of conscience, most of which—maybe not all—Members of this House would find deeply unpalatable.