My hon. Friend missed out on the opportunity that I and the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) had of serving on the Financial Services Bill Committee. We spent a considerable amount of time developing the details of jurisdiction in the UK, through giving powers to the Financial Services Authority. There are areas where rules are made at a European level, but, equally, there are areas where rules are made in the UK, and it is not appropriate to say, “There’s only European law.” There is a whole raft of UK law on these matters.
To date, the UK has used the flexibility of the minimum harmonisation EU directive to create a stronger standard, applying the regime to more venues and having stronger rules. Now we have the opportunity to have a better framework applied across the whole of the EU, and that is in our interests.
It is clear that market abuse can take place beyond our borders and yet still affect securities traded within our borders. For that reason, the Government support the Commission’s objective to revise the EU market abuse framework. Improving the strength and consistency of the framework is vital to investor confidence.
There are challenges and opportunities in shifting to a regulation. There are challenges if the UK’s own practices are compromised. There are opportunities from having a more consistent and stronger EU regime and potentially reducing the cost and complexity of compliance for market actors.
Clearly, our prime objective is to ensure that the powers currently available to competent authorities are not weakened, which would damage the UK and the creditable work of the FSA. Secondly, we wish to deliver a robust framework for tackling market abuse within Europe.
Interest in changes to the market abuse framework extends beyond this House. In March, the European Central Bank published its opinion of the market abuse proposals. Its commentary focused largely on the new provision in the regulation for competent authorities to be able to delay the publication of inside information with systemic consequences. The Government echo the ECB’s support for seeking the legal framework to be
improved in this respect. This is a key provision for the Bank of England and the FSA following the financial crisis and the difficulties experienced surrounding the disclosure of emergency lending assistance.
I want to outline briefly the EU market abuse package proposed by the Commission. In October 2011, the Commission published a regulation and an accompanying directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse. Those proposals together update the framework formerly established by the market abuse directive 2003, including proposing EU harmonisation of criminal law for market abuse for the first time. The legal basis for the criminal directive is article 83(2) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. This is the first use of the relevant provision since the Lisbon treaty was agreed. It means that the directive is subject to a justice and home affairs opt-in. The UK and Ireland have discretion on whether it should apply to them. Denmark is automatically opted out. In light of the fact that this was the first use of the article, it was important that the Government carefully contemplated the issues and came to the appropriate decision.
The European Scrutiny Committee also considered the use of the opt-in. In its 52nd report of the last Session, the Committee noted that the full potential impact for the UK of the draft directive will become certain only once negotiations are concluded. The European Affairs Committee concurred with that opinion, but we are, of course, bound by the regulation.
The Government’s decision not to opt in at this time is a reflection of the sequencing of the directive compared with related legislative proposals. The proposed directive is entirely dependent on the outcome of the market abuse regulation, and the markets in financial instruments directive, which are both in relatively early stages of negotiation. The Government believe that it is very challenging to assess the implications, scope and way that the criminal directive may develop, given the broader uncertainty of the market abuse framework, which itself is simultaneously subject to a major review.
The key issue here is ensuring that the interaction between the criminal and administrative regimes is clear and workable for all member states. Above all, we need to address the flexibility of when to apply a criminal penalty and when an administrative penalty needs to be retained within member states’ national systems. That must be determined on a case-by-case basis, in light of the evidence of an individual case. In addition, there was uncertainty about whether the powers of competent authorities would be weakened in respect of accessing telephone records in the regulation and, potentially, the accompanying criminal directive.
It is essential that competent authorities have the flexibility to determine the appropriate type of penalty—whether it is criminal or administrative—and the powers available to them to investigate suspected cases of market abuse. The Council has itself recognised the difficulties involved in trying to complete negotiations on the criminal directive, with linked proposals being negotiated simultaneously. Therefore, the presidency decided to pause progress on the directive, in order to wait for policy progress to be made in the market abuse regulation.
However, I note that although the Government have decided not to opt in at this stage, we have continued to participate fully in negotiations. It is important that we
use our expertise in combating market abuse, including the fact that the UK already covers market abuse in its criminal law today. If we are able to do that, and further progress the related proposals in the market abuse regulation and the markets in financial instruments directive in a manner that meets our objectives, we may consider opting in to the criminal directive. We can assess this only when the trio of proposals are properly progressed.