Water Industry (Financial Assistance) Bill

Rather than have a long dialogue, I will let the hon. Gentleman have a copy of my submission to Thames Water later, so he can read my full views. However, let me summarise, as I did in my submission:"““I am now clear that, since the end of the first round of consultations in 2011, the arguments for a review of the full tunnel proposal and possible alternatives have substantially increased. There has been a growing amount of opposition against the full tunnel from my constituents and other constituents in greater London.””" I go on to say that we should therefore give that argument greater weight. Let me turn to the substance of the financial issues, which are dealt with in this part of the Bill. Back in 2007, a memorandum was submitted to the Treasury Committee by a Mr Martin Blaiklock—consultant, infrastructure and energy project finance—on the subject of Thames Water specifically, but also on equity-type investment generally. He said:"““Over the last 12 months I have be keeping a particularly close watch on the activities of Thames Water, not least because I am a Thames Water customer, but also because it is one example,—and a good example,—of Private Equity involvement with public services. The case of Thames is significant as it is the UK's largest privatised water utility, serving the Capital and 13 million customers, and also a monopoly service provider...Thames Water Utilities Limited…is the utility licensed by OFWAT. However, Thames Water Utilities Limited is 5 or 6 times removed from the controlling investor group…of whom a number are based offshore in Luxemburg…Is this the 'transparent' corporate structure expected of a UK monopoly public service provider?””" I cannot put this on the record, but there is a helpful graph in that memorandum to the Treasury Committee showing Thames Water Utilities Ltd at the bottom. Above it are lots of holding companies, including Thames Water plc, Thames Water Holdings plc, Kemble Water Ltd and Kemble Water Holdings Ltd, and intermediate holding companies. The list goes right up to non-Macquarie investors and then to Macquarie, and shows the purchase of part of the company by the Chinese state finance organisation and others. That shows an organisation that does not do transparent finance. We therefore need certain safeguards to be put in place to protect any taxpayer investment and Government support. The company also has considerable activity in the Cayman Islands. I am not sure whether that is the most appropriate way for a major utility company to spend its money. The tax arrangements of Thames Water, having been bought by Kemble, have involved setting up a subsidiary financing branch in the Cayman Islands, based at Ugland House, which has 18,856 other businesses registered at it. There is a real question of transparency for Thames Water, and the Government need to have a public debate on it. We need to look at this matter in Committee and on Report to determine exactly how the financing arrangements are arrived at. There is at the moment no proposal from Thames Water as to how it will raise the £4.1 billion to finance the project, and I am concerned that the cost might ultimately be borne by the Thames Water ratepayer, which might not provide the best value for money for our constituents who pay their bills. Mr Blaiklock concluded:"““There is no doubt that the introduction of Private Equity-type investment into the privatised UK public services has sharpened up the financial management of such enterprises. However, such Private Equity investment has also""(a) introduced a lack of transparency in the control, governance and, therefore, the accounts of such utilities. Some utilities, such as Thames Water, are effectively owned and controlled offshore, possibly by companies with limited liability and domiciled in tax havens. Corporate information is, not surprisingly, hard to come by for such Private Equity investments! Hence, in the event of operational failure by such utilities…it is quite possible that the controlling company and its directors cannot be called to account, notwithstanding OFWAT's Conditions P and F licensing requirements…""(b) increased the leverage and, thereby, decreased the financial strength of such utilities, at the expense of customers and the security of service; and""(c) introduced corporate uncertainty. The investment horizon for Private Equity is traditionally three to five years, which is short for public service utilities, which require long-term capital and financial stability. The only balancing feature has been the increased intervention, as direct investors, by pension funds and life insurance companies—as principals, not clients—albeit some are offshore owned and controlled. Such investors have longer time horizons and are ideal investors for such public service utilities.””" The other activity that is certainly questionable is the way in which Thames Water has managed its affairs in recent years. Extremely high dividend payments have been made over the past years, representing a direct transfer of income and capital out of Thames Water to private investors. At the financial year end in 2011, Thames Water made £225.2 million in profits, but it distributed £271.4 million in dividends. This high dividend policy is a recent development, but it is not limited to last year. In 2010, the unadjusted common dividend payout ratio, in percentage terms, was 141.5%—that is, nearly half as much again was paid out. The figure for 2009 was 126.7%—a quarter as much paid out again as was made in profits; and in 2008, 61.3% was paid out. That contrasts with Anglian Water's dividend ratio of 81.%, Southern Water's 58.7% and South East Water's 48.4%. The policy of paying higher returns to investors started immediately after the company was purchased by the consortium behind Kemble Holdings in 2007. The company paid out £535 million in dividends in 2007, and £233 million in 2008. All this has happened while the company has vastly increased its debt position. In the financial report of 2008, the change in the amount of debt held by Thames Water was more than £1.5 billion. Ofwat warned the bidding companies to keep a good debt ratio, advising that 45% would be appropriate. The ratio is now at 80%. We—Parliament—and the Government need to ask why Thames Water has increased its debt holding by so much when it is known that it has an extremely large capital project coming up, which will need a substantial amount of borrowing. My question to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is whether the Government have investigated whether Thames Water would have been able to make a greater contribution to any scheme from its own funds if it had not spent the last few years borrowing money in order to pay itself. Both the financial policy and the tax arrangements of Thames Water seem to me to be appropriate for us to debate. My conclusion is that we might need to insert conditions into the Bill regarding any financial arrangements whereby the Government underwrite the borrowing by Thames Water, making it clear that they should be transparent, ethical and accountable so that Thames Water users, those of us who represent people in the Thames Water area and everybody else in the country can understand that there has been some pretty strange organisational finance going on in the last five years. We must make sure that the objectives do not feather the nests of the equity investors rather than benefit Thames Water users, so we must ensure that we have the right financial vehicles if we are to go ahead with infrastructure projects like this one. We will have plenty of opportunity to debate the project itself on other occasions, but I hope that the Secretary of State will be sensitive, as I know the Treasury is sensitive, to these real concerns about how Thames Water runs its financial affairs.