Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Your Lordships will recall that in connection with an earlier amendment I referred to the existing test—which will continue to apply under this Bill—for the Parole Board to apply in considering whether a person should be released. The existing test is that the board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. Your Lordships will recall the criticisms that I made of that. In his reply, the Minister said that Clause 117 gives power to the Lord Chancellor to change that test. I am a little bit puzzled, and I ask my noble friend to explain why that power to change the test is in there. Furthermore, I am very pleased that it is, because I think that the present test is neither fair nor just. The power to change the test is in subsection (1), where, "““the Parole Board … must direct the prisoner’s release if it is satisfied that conditions specified in the order are met, or … must do so unless it is satisfied that conditions specified in the order are met””." I know that my noble friend, as he earlier confessed, is a follower of Blackpool football club, but at the weekend he may have had the opportunity of watching the Wales versus Ireland rugby match at Lansdowne Road. An incident there perfectly illustrates the situation. There was a pile-up over the line and the referee, instead of making the decision and awarding the try which Wales had so clearly scored, called in the TMO and said, ““Has the try been scored—yes or no?””. Immediately, that illustrious and brilliant commentator Jonathan Davies, a brilliant player in his own day, said, ““He’s asking the wrong question. The question he should ask is: ‘Is there any reason why this try should not be awarded?’””. By asking it as, ““Has he scored it—yes or no?””, the referee was pushing the decision over to the TMO; but if he were to ask the second question, he would be taking responsibility by saying, ““I am going to award the try unless you tell me that there is a reason why I should not””. Applying the same approach to the release of a prisoner, the Parole Board should not be asking whether the prisoner has complied with this or that test; it should be asking: ““Is there any reason why we should not release this prisoner? Is evidence being produced for us to look at in reaching a conclusion on whether this prisoner can be safely returned to the community?””. That is the reason why I support Clause 117—in the hope that the second alternative, in subsection (1)(b), is adopted, and that the Lord Chancellor will then very quickly see the necessity of changing the Parole Board’s test to one that is far fairer: ““Is there any reason why, after serving the period of the tariff that the judge has imposed””—which is supposed to be what the judge would have awarded by way of a sentence had he taken that course—““this person should not be released?””. I commend this clause and suggest that the power should be exercised very quickly.