This goes absolutely to the heart of the issue. The reality is that if we have a tripartite or quartet system in which the statutory regulator is not the same as the Governor, the head of the PRA or the head of the Financial Services Authority can have a different view and say that in their judgment the threat to the company and to the system is so great that it justifies action, even if the Governor judges that the moral hazard risks from intervention override that threat, and that therefore there should not be a request for public funds. In the current system, the Chancellor would hear from the head of the FSA—from Adair Turner—whereas under the new system and the memorandum of understanding he will not hear, other than from the person of the Governor. My question to the Chancellor is: does he worry about that and about the potential instability and misinformation to him which could come as a result of the memorandum of understanding that he has drafted?
Financial Services Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Ed Balls
(Labour)
in the House of Commons on Monday, 6 February 2012.
It occurred during Debate on bills on Financial Services Bill.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
540 c57 
Session
2010-12
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Librarians' tools
Timestamp
2023-12-15 15:25:18 +0000
URI
http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_807284
In Indexing
http://indexing.parliament.uk/Content/Edit/1?uri=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_807284
In Solr
https://search.parliament.uk/claw/solr/?id=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_807284