Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

My Lords, I have to confess that I have not heard that news, although they are obviously tragic circumstances and I associate myself with expressions of regret. When one does not know the circumstances, I always find it very difficult to extrapolate from them to a wider general principle. I hope that my noble friend will forgive me if I do not follow him down that line, because I simply do not know all the facts and circumstances. In decisions on whether legal aid is required to fulfil the state’s obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR, it would seem incongruous to make it a statutory requirement for the chief coroner to be asked for his or her views on the significant wider public interest aspect of the case. To compel the director to consult the chief coroner in all cases which come for a determination is likely to add considerably to the administrative element of the assessment process and lead to delays for bereaved families. In turn, it would represent a burden on the chief coroner, who would almost certainly be unfamiliar with the circumstances of many cases, unlike the individual coroner who is holding the inquest. The chief coroner would therefore be required to acquaint him or herself with information pertaining to a number of cases with no obvious benefit for bereaved families, who have a locus in this. In these circumstances, there is no obvious benefit in individual coroners or the chief coroner mandating what would inevitably be an additional process in the legal proceedings. Amendment 92A would compel the director to make provision for the payment of reasonable costs incurred by any person making a successful application under this section. The concept of ““reasonable costs”” is open to broad interpretation and might be seen to authorise payments at a commercial rather than a legal aid rate. Nevertheless, discussions with the Legal Services Commission about the precise remuneration arrangements for exceptional funding applications are ongoing and we fully expect to propose that the costs associated with the making of successful exceptional funding applications will be payable. I hope that that gives some reassurance to the noble Lord. The exceptional funding scheme being introduced by the Government will give the director a narrowly drawn power to provide civil legal services that are not available under Schedule 1—hence their being ““excluded cases””—where there are exceptional circumstances. We have reviewed questions of the European convention and issues relating to the death of a family member. An individual must qualify for such services in accordance, too, with Clause 10, which means that decisions on exceptional funding will be subject to the means and merits criteria. However, we believe that this is an essential safeguard for fundamental rights of access to justice which will underpin our proposals for changes to the scope of civil legal aid. The Director of Legal Aid Casework will make these exceptional funding decisions. This is a departure from the current position where the Lord Chancellor makes individual funding decisions in relation to excluded cases. Clause 4(4), which has already been debated, explicitly prohibits the Lord Chancellor from giving directions or guidance to the director in relation to individual cases. This will guarantee the objectivity of the decision-making process, in respect of both in-scope and excluded cases, and serve as a safeguard against political interference. Clause 9(3)(a) provides the director with the power to make an exceptional case determination where the director considers that the failure to provide legal services to an individual would be a breach of the individual’s rights under the convention or European Union law, as we have discussed. I recognise that concerns have been expressed about the parameters of the exceptional funding scheme that the Bill will create. I am sure—it is obviously the case—that many noble Lords would prefer a broader discretionary power in the Bill but, if I may take the Committee back to the fundamental purposes of the changes that we are making to the general legal aid scheme, we need these reforms to create a fair, balanced and sustainable legal aid system. We have taken into account the importance of the issue; the litigant’s ability to present his or her own case, including the vulnerability of the litigant; the availability of alternative sources of funding; and the availability of other routes towards resolution. We have used these factors to prioritise funding so that civil legal aid will be available in the highest priority cases—again, I repeat, essentially where, first and foremost, people’s lives and liberty are at stake; they are at risk of serious physical harm; they risk the immediate loss of their home; or their children may be taken into care. If we make wholesale changes to the exceptional funding provisions in the Bill, we risk undermining the overall reforms to the scope of civil legal aid. That said, it is nevertheless our expectation that there will be several thousand applications under the new scheme and that there will not be a fixed budget for exceptional funding. It is our intention to publish more details concerning the operation of the proposed exceptional funding scheme and the associated guidance in due course. The guidance will largely be based on the factors that the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights have held to be relevant in determining whether publicly funded legal assistance must be provided in an individual case. In these circumstances, we believe that this will be a route down which applicants will go and, as my noble friend said when moving his amendment, that it will cover a considerable number of cases. I invite my noble friend to withdraw the amendment and to be reassured by the structure and architecture which is in place with this important clause, in addition to those cases which already will be in scope under Schedule 1.