The Economy

The plan of the Prime Minister and the Chancellor had been fiscal austerity coupled with an evacuation from the public sector, and it was initially assumed that that plan would by itself provide private sector growth. The plan has clearly failed because of its flawed logic and odd priorities. Under that flawed logic, more spending was planned for Post Office mutualisation than the original English regional growth fund. Forecast growth has consistently been downgraded, while borrowing has been consistently revised upwards, from £46 billion extra to more than £158 billion extra and rising. While deficit reduction is highlighted by the Prime Minister, private sector growth was assumed, reliant upon foreign consumption at a time of international downturn in all consumption. That international downturn is nowhere more evident than in the eurozone, which the Government are at pains to attack politically at a time when the eurozone needs political union more than ever in order to provide fiscal credibility. Counter-intuitively however, the Government undermine the required confidence, and in so doing only succeed in bad-mouthing the very export markets we so desperately need to retain in the interim until new market partners are developed. Not until last week's autumn statement did we hear an acceptance by the Chancellor that private sector investment requires confidence and a reduction in risk via the injection of public investment. That is either achieved directly by underwriting projects or, as we have seen, by off-balance-sheet lending on an unprecedented scale. That lending is, of course, premised upon Britain's own position in respect of a now highly likely eurozone bank failure if no political union is established to reinforce fiscal union. The consequences of that will be extraordinarily grave for our financial institutions, given the potential for contagion. What is even more troubling is that the Office for Budget Responsibility believes the effect of the autumn statement's attempt to rectify this situation is negligible. The Chancellor will also be aware that the Bank of England has purchased 42% of gilt issuance, owning 30% of total gilt stock. Britain's interest rates have been made lower as result. That has been achieved by the independent Bank of England's purchasing policy, not because of the Chancellor's fiscal measures. It is interesting to note that this self-given ““safe haven status”” by the Chancellor has not led to increased international market ownership of British gilts. Indeed, international market ownership of gilts has not changed from 2008 levels. Quantitative easing is also a reason for that. When the independent Bank of England buys gilts from banks and pension funds, some of the money is re-channelled into the sterling corporate bond market. That is great for the City, sterling and London property investment, but as yet there has been no trickle-down for regional small and medium-sized enterprises or regional high streets despite the much-hailed Project Merlin. What have been the consequences of the Government's counter-intuitive policy for manufacturing and industry? I should state that the Government's aim to address our deteriorating balance of trade in order to create the surpluses we need is admirable. However, our balance of trade has deteriorated in the last 18 months under the Prime Minister's and Chancellor's watch. Last month's Markit and Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply index slumped to 47.6, the lowest level since June 2009. Any figure below 50 is usually an early indicator of contraction. In the EEF's last quarterly survey of more than 450 manufacturers the growth forecast for 2012 has been cut to 0.9% from 2.5%, a figure it predicted only a few months ago. There is obviously a contraction, and a contraction that prefigures the eurozone crisis. This contraction undermines the Government's valid ambition to pursue export-led manufacturing growth. There is no manufacturing growth, and also an interim skills mismatch as any private sector manufacturing roles are being supplied with surplus labour from mass public sector redundancies and retail redundancies. In the 1980s there was the cultural phenomenon of mass long-term male unemployment due to a politicised attack upon unionised, largely male, manufacturing sites, and we now face the proposition of mass female unemployment as the public sector and retail sector shed employees, again in the public sector's case due to a largely anti-trade union, dogmatic narrative mirroring the diatribes from the Conservatives in the 1980s.