Credit Institutions and Investment Firms

It has been declining, and that is another reason for concern, but the latest figure is something of the order of 15% to 20% of our gross domestic product. Take that away, and where would we be? The draft regulation is a deliberate attempt to do that, and it is only one document of many. The aim of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is to"““enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide.””" I hope that it succeeds. However, the various directives in question relate to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and to capital adequacy, and they are collectively known as the capital requirement directive or CRD. They introduce a supervisory framework within the EU, designed, it is stated, to"““ensure the financial soundness of credit institutions (banks and building societies) and certain investment firms.””" I take a slight interest in that, because my family founded the Abbey National building society back in the 19th century and the National Provident Institution in 1835. Those institutions were run on sound grounds and lasted until very recently, but have unfortunately now been mopped up as a result of some of the international goings-on in the financial sphere. In 2011, the European Commission proposed a draft regulation—the document referred to in the motion—and a draft directive, known together as CRD IV. They would incorporate the Basel III agreement on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms into EU law. How often have I said that the danger is that when a matter is transferred to EU jurisdiction, we lose control? Because of section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972, we cease to be able to control it. We hand over control of the drafting, method and interpretation of the law, and its effect on our own institutions, our own initiative and our own ability to be innovative and succeed. The proposals are still before the European Scrutiny Committee, pending the receipt of further information from the Government. Meanwhile, the Committee has recommended that the House submit a reasoned opinion on the draft regulation to the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. A draft is annexed to the Committee's report. I mention that because if enough member states issue a reasoned opinion, we will be able to stop the proposals. I strongly urge the Government to get as many member states as possible together, and I am sure they are doing that, if only to retrieve the situation as best they can. Of course, as we all know, other member states will know what we are up to, and they will not enter into an arrangement to submit a reasoned opinion. We have seen that in the past—we do not get the requisite number of member states, and the proposal goes through. This is a test not just of the Government but of the integrity of the system. If a reasoned opinion is required because the Commission has exceeded its powers in relation to subsidiarity, nothing should prevent that from going ahead on an objective basis. I am not trying to pre-empt the decision, but I am anxious, on the grounds that I am about to mention, for other member states to understand that a reasoned opinion is necessary. It is in their hands to prevent the proposals from going through. I turn now to the argument about the objectivity of a reasoned opinion. When the Commission makes a proposal for legislation, it is now required under the European treaties to produce a ““detailed statement”” that makes it possible to appraise the proposal's compliance with the principles of subsidiarity. I do not for a minute demur from what I said during the Maastricht debates—that subsidiarity was a con trick intended to establish hierarchies, not true subsidiarity. We shall see. That detailed statement is not just a bureaucratic procedure for its own sake, although one might be forgiven for thinking that some in Brussels think it is. It is the principal means left whereby national Parliaments and electorates can assess the basis on which the Commission considers legislation to be necessary at supranational rather than national level. The presumption underpinning subsidiarity is that decisions are best taken as close to the citizen as possible. Amen to that, providing that it happens. It is not sufficient to underline the importance of those detailed statements. I remind, or inform, the House that no piece of European legislation has ever successfully been challenged in the Court of Justice of the EU on the grounds that it breached subsidiarity. Not one. That sends a very powerful message. There is not a little suspicion, therefore, that subsidiarity is just something to which lip service is paid. It strikes the democratic gong, but is not followed by any lunch. One of the jobs of national Parliaments—that is us here in the Chamber—is to try to change that position.