Armed Forces Bill

My Lords, I am happy to do that. Indeed, my speaking note covers one of these points. I respond by explaining that the Military Lands Acts 1892 and 1900 allow the Secretary of State for Defence to make by-laws to regulate the public use of military land and certain areas of the sea used for military purposes. Under the 1900 Act, by-laws affecting public rights of use of the sea and shore also require the consent of the Board of Trade. Therefore, one of these Acts referred to defence, the other to the Board of Trade. Change is needed because over the years the wide-ranging responsibilities of the Board of Trade have been reduced and redistributed. Following transfers of functions, these responsibilities are currently held by the Department for Transport. The clause therefore amends the Military Lands Act 1900 in order to remove the requirement that the Secretary of State for Defence must seek the consent of the Board of Trade when he proposes to make by-laws in respect of certain sea, tidal water and shore areas that might affect certain public rights. The rights in question relate to navigation, anchoring, the grounding of vessels, fishing, bathing, walking and recreation. As well as removing the requirement for the Board of Trade’s consent, the clause requires that, before making such by-laws in the future, the Secretary of State for Defence should take all reasonable steps to ascertain whether the by-law would injuriously affect existing public rights. If it would, he must satisfy himself that the restriction is required for the safety of the public or for the military purpose for which the land is used, and that the restriction imposed is only to such extent as is reasonable. The procedure for giving public notice and allowing and considering public objection to any by-law currently runs under two different provisions: one for the Board of Trade—and so, now, for the Secretary of State for Transport—in the 1900 Act, and one for the Secretary of State for Defence through the 1892 Act. However, the provisions are almost identical in effect and the clause therefore provides for the repeal of the provision referring to consultation by the Board of Trade and leaves in place the provision exercised by the Secretary of State for Defence. The clause will therefore not affect the consultation that is carried out before making military by-laws. As now, the legislation will require the Secretary of State to publicise his proposals, to give an opportunity for the making of objections and to consider those objections before deciding. The clause also amends the Military Lands Act 1892 in relation to the procedure for publishing by-laws once they have been made. The clause removes the requirement for the Secretary of State to publish the by-laws in such a manner as appears to him necessary to make them known to all persons in the locality, and replaces it with a requirement that he publish the by-laws in such manner as appears to him appropriate. This is because interest in the effect of by-laws is no longer limited to the immediate locality. As part of this process of consultation, the relevant Defence Minister writes to the MP in whose constituency the site is located to tell them about the forthcoming public consultation. Advertisements are then placed on the Ministry of Defence website, in national and local newspapers, post offices and libraries, and on notices around the site. In addition, depending on the location of the affected site and the interests that are engaged, Ministry of Defence officials may contact the relevant devolved Administration; the county, district or unitary authority; the parish council, community council or parish meeting that covers the site; the police authority for the area, or its successor as agreed under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill; all people who have expressed an interest; and a range of government and other organisations, such as the Health and Safety Executive, the Environment Agency, the Forestry Commission, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Crown Estate and, if church property is likely to be affected, the appropriate diocese. Consultation normally runs for five weeks, although we would consider objections that were received after the end of the period as long as the by-laws had not yet been made. All comments are considered and, if possible, changes are agreed with the MoD site operator. All representations are summarised together with the department’s response and presented to the Minister before he is invited to sign to bring the by-laws into force. As a general rule, the Ministry of Defence consults more widely than we are required to do so by statute. We have no plans to reduce the amount of consultation that we usually undertake, and the provisions in the Bill will not alter our approach in this area. In view of this full explanation, I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Tunnicliffe, will agree with me that Clause 24 should after all stand part of the Bill. Before I complete the contribution from the Government to today’s Committee stage, I should like to say a few words on a separate but related issue—the report on the Armed Forces Bill published by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on 14 July. My noble friend the Minister has written to the committee chairman, my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester, with the Government’s response to the report. In doing so, he undertook to speak to one of the powers to which the committee drew attention. This was in relation to Clause 32, which deals with the commencement of the legislation, and in particular the transitional measures with reference to courts martial proposed in subsection (5). In his absence, I hope that the Committee will allow me to do so. The report noted that the House may wish to seek a further explanation and satisfy itself that the provisions of subsection (5) should require no parliamentary scrutiny. As the report notes, it is usual for the standard form of transitional power conferred in Clause 32(4) to be exercisable without parliamentary scrutiny. Subsection (5) is not intended as an extension of the power in subsection (4) but is considered useful to make it clear that the power in subsection (4) will be needed to deal with particular situations that may arise under new Schedule 3A to the Armed Forces Act 2006. The situation that we have in mind is that, if an accused person elects trial by court martial instead of by his commanding officer, the court’s powers are limited to those of the commanding officer. The Bill affects, but does not diminish, commanding officers’ powers of punishment, so it will be necessary to provide for the powers that the court martial will have in a trial after commencement of the Armed Forces Act in the case of an accused who had made his election before commencement. This is therefore very much a transitional measure. I reassure the Committee that our intention is to ensure that the court martial will not be able to impose a more severe sentence than that which a commanding officer could have imposed when the accused made his election. For those reasons, I hope that the Committee will accept that it is appropriate that provision under subsections (4) and (5) should be made by statutory instrument with no parliamentary procedure.