Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

I did not say that it did. I said that it had misgivings about the fact that there had been no opportunity for pre-legislative scrutiny because this was a first-Session Bill. My point was that in its recent report—and not just in the paragraph that I quoted; throughout the report—it had said that constitutional change should be carried out properly. The idea that constitutional provisions such as this should be switched on and off through simple resolutions rather than through the proper legislative process, which involves consideration by both Houses of Parliament, is not appropriate. We agree with the sentiment expressed in the paragraph that I have just read out, which is why we oppose Lord Pannick's amendments. Given that Lord Pannick is a member of the Constitution Committee and presumably supports the proper conduct of constitutional change, it is surprising that he is trying to insert in the Bill something that we do not think appropriate. We should also bear in mind that both Houses recently engaged in a debate similar to this during the passage of what is now the European Union Act 2011, and that both Houses decided that it would not be appropriate to include a sunset provision in that Act. In the debate, Lord Lamont wisely noted that a sunset provision was not appropriate because it would provide for primary legislation to be reversed by a simple resolution. We believe that the Lords amendments would have the same effect on this Bill, turning important amendments to the statute book on and off without proper scrutiny. The report of the European Scrutiny Committee on the European Union Bill states:"““All Parliaments legislate for the future. Laws passed by one Parliament do not contain a sunset clause at the Dissolution. The real point is whether a government can, in law, make it difficult for a future Parliament to amend or repeal the legislation it has passed; in our view it cannot. Our conclusion therefore is straightforward—that an Act of Parliament applies until it is repealed””." That can also be said of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. Should a future Parliament wish to amend or repeal the legislation, it could of course do so, but we believe that it should do so through the normal legislative process, not simply by passing, or failing to pass, a resolution. That, however, is not the only problem with the Lords amendments. They clearly assume that it would be possible for the Prime Minister to regain the option of asking Her Majesty the Queen to dissolve Parliament, but it is entirely possible that, by failing to provide for the prerogative power to dissolve to be reinstated, they have left matters in the position where neither the rules in the Bill nor the previous prerogative powers can have effect. Indeed, it is worth asking whether it is possible to reinstate a prerogative power that has been removed. It should also be noted that the United Kingdom Parliament did not think it appropriate to include sunset clauses when legislating for fixed terms for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly. It is not entirely clear why it should consider it appropriate to ““sunset”” the fixed terms for this Parliament. Let us be clear: the Government believe that the sunset amendments would wreck the Bill and the principle of the Bill, which is why we oppose them. Our view was shared by others in the House of Lords. Lord Dobbs noted that the sole purpose of the amendments was to ““wreck”” the Bill, and went on to say:"““This issue has effectively been decided in this House and in another place, whether we like it or agree with it or not. I would not say that to support a sunset clause on this occasion is unethical, but it is entirely inappropriate. We do not use it on any of the other constitutional Bills; it is not the time to start doing it now.””—[Official Report, House of Lords, 18 July 2011; Vol. 729, c. 1096.]" Nevertheless, I have no doubt that the Members of the other place who gave us the amendments in the first place, and have given them back to us unchanged, have good intentions. I know that they are concerned about the major constitutional change to fixed-term Parliaments, and the abandoning of the current system whereby the Prime Minister has the power to call a general election whenever it suits his political purposes. I believe that the change that we propose is a good one—it works in many other countries, and in the devolved legislatures—but I understand why any significant change is apt to cause concern. That is why the system of post-legislative scrutiny exists, making it possible to consider whether measures are working and to make recommendations. We recognise the concerns that have been expressed, and we wish to give formal reassurance of a kind that is consistent with the principle of the Bill. Our amendment in lieu, which we tabled last Friday and which we wish to substitute for Lord Pannick's three amendments, would provide that the Prime Minister must make arrangements to set up a committee to review the Bill's operation after the first full fixed term, in 2020. Those arrangements would require the committee, if appropriate, to make recommendations for the repeal or amendment of the Act. That provides a categorical reassurance that the Bill will be given full post-legislative scrutiny. It is a much better solution than simply allowing a significant piece of legislation to lapse.