Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) Regulations 2011

My Lords, I should declare a couple of interests before I say anything. First, I was the architect of a Private Member's Bill on equality that went through this House and became a kind of model for what came later. Secondly, I am counsel to the National Secular Society in the intervention in the pending Strasbourg proceedings and, therefore, will not say anything about the cases that have been placed before the European Court of Human Rights. Thirdly, I am so old that I can remember listening for the past 40 years to the arguments I heard just now basically attacking equality legislation root and branch and suggesting it should be consigned to the dustbin. The most useful way in which I can assist the House is to begin by explaining a bit more about the framework within which this debate takes place as that might throw some light on what we are talking about. The previous Government, will all-party support—I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, in particular for having led the Government at the time on this issue in this House—were responsible for introducing Section 149 of the Equality Act, which is the public sector equality duty. That duty was already in our law in relation to gender, ethnicity and disability, but it was strengthened in important respects by the previous Government with support from all three main parties right across the House. The duty requires every public authority in the exercise of its functions to have due regard to three things: first, to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and other conduct which is prohibited; secondly, to advance equality of opportunity between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and those who do not; and, thirdly, to foster good relations between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and others. The duty covers various grounds, including religion or belief. I assume that even the staunchest opponents of the legislation are pleased that discrimination on grounds of religion and belief is covered. I say with all respect that it has nothing to do with positive discrimination, which is dealt with in a limited form by a completely different provision. It imposes a general public sector duty. There are particular problems about the way in which the duty treats religion and belief in the same way as the other protected characteristics. Some would argue, and I would be one of them, that religion is too strongly protected in the legislation, but we really need not go into that today. The Explanatory Notes on the Equality Act make it clear that a whole range of religions, including Catholicism, Protestantism, Liberal Judaism, Orthodox Judaism and various forms of Islam, are to be looked at individually and separately if there is an allegation of discrimination. That is the framework. The power being exercised under the regulations is to give better governance in complying with that general duty. Complaints about the Act itself were settled by the previous Parliament when it enacted the legislation. Where I part company with the noble Lord, Lord Low, with whom I hate ever to disagree, is in believing that his amendment—I have already had the advantage of speaking to him about it—is a real example of over-regulation of the worst kind. The best way in which I can illustrate that is by giving just one example, that of religion. Under the general duty, every public authority has to have due regard to the three things that I mentioned. The first thing that an authority has to do under the law is to identify within its area various religious, irreligious, non-religious and atheistic groups. Then it has to decide whether something needs to be done in order to tackle inequality, discrimination and so on with regard to those groups. The regulations strip down the core needs to ensure compliance with the general duty in a well targeted and sensible way. They state that each public authority must publish information to demonstrate its compliance with the Section 149 duty, which is quite right and entirely sensible. They further state that the information has to include information relating to persons who share a relevant protected characteristic, which they define—perfectly sensible. The third thing that the authority must do is prepare and publish one or more objectives that it thinks will achieve the things that I have already mentioned. Again, that is perfectly sensible. Then they say that the objective must be ““specific and measurable”” —again entirely sensible. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Low, would add that each public authority in the country must, "““publish information on equality analyses they have undertaken … set objectives designed to facilitate compliance with the General Equality Duty … publish information about the engagement they have had with affected groups when developing these objectives and … report annually on progress towards meeting these objectives””." I do not wish to be unmannerly in saying that it reads a bit Soviet—