Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 (Consequential Provisions) Order 2011

My Lords, I begin by welcoming the clarity of my noble friend's explanation of the two orders. I also thank him for the very helpful Explanatory Memorandum that sets out their purposes and consequences. There are, consequentially, very few questions that I will raise, because most of the points have been very clearly made. On the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 (Consequential Provisions) Order 2011, have the recent United Kingdom changes in the proposed availability of legal aid affected, or will they affect in any way, the availability of legal aid to those who are suspected of serious crimes such as those mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum? I note that powers to make regulations disapplying the financial eligibility criteria are referred to, as well as the criteria for giving advice and assistance to such suspects. It is also stated that the provision will be underpinned by a ministerial agreement and an administrative arrangement, and that the provision of legal aid to HMRC and UKBA suspects will be on equivalent terms to the provisions made for legal aid in relation to persons detained by police constables in Scotland. Will the Minister explain whether that agreement has been arrived at and is waiting for its effectiveness only on the passage of this order, or whether it has yet to be agreed—and, if so, with whom? The provisions on detention seem to be eminently sensible. It would be of some interest to know whether they are reciprocal. Does this mirror what happens if suspects are taken into custody by police constables in England? So far as concerns the second order, again there are very few questions that have not been addressed. I would be interested to know what gave rise to the awareness of the desirability of making this change, which will result in orders being made under the 2007 Act to clarify that the 1978 Act does not apply in present circumstances. Whereas in the case of the first order there was a passage merely of weeks before it was laid, in the case of the other there has been a passage of four years. How is that explicable? I will ask a procedural question. When changes are made by the Scottish Parliament or Government, is it automatically part of the dialogue between the Scotland Office and these institutions to consider any consequential changes that ought to be made by this Parliament under the provisions of the Scotland Act? Did this have to be drawn to someone's attention? Is it the sort of issue that the Scottish Law Commission might consider on a continuing basis or is it such a relatively minor matter—although the consequences are not unimportant—that difficulties became apparent only in seeking to take into account particular cases of adoption that arose after the law was changed? I recognise that this procedural question does not in any way take exception to the outcomes, which seem eminently sensible.