Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

In these circumstances, yes. Had this Bill been in place, that could have happened. Perhaps I may reassure my noble friend Lord Cormack that 14 days is a maximum, but if there is consensus in the House that there should be an immediate election, it would be possible the following day for a Motion commanding the support of two-thirds of Members for an early election to be passed and there would be no need to wait for 14 days. I hope that is clear. It is an important point that perhaps has not always been fully appreciated; there may have been an impression that after every Motion of no confidence there would have to be a period of 14 days before there could be an election. The proposed new power in the amendment for the other place to vote explicitly for an early Dissolution deals with the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to move directly to a Dissolution and a general election, as I have said, and there may be other circumstances. There has been some suggestion that the situation in 1951 could have led to that happening. My noble friend also proposes that an early general election should be called if the Prime Minister tenders the resignation of the Government to Her Majesty and if within 14 days no new Prime Minister has accepted Her Majesty’s invitation to form a Government. Therefore, my noble friend’s amendment would still provide for an alternative Government to be formed without a general election taking place. The difference is that my noble friend’s amendment would provide that a Prime Minister’s decision to resign can trigger an early election, whereas the triggers that we are proposing involve a parliamentary procedure and deny, as far as is possible, the Prime Minister’s ability to trigger a Dissolution against the will of Parliament. Under my noble friend’s amendment it would also be possible for a Prime Minister enjoying a working majority in the other place to resign, sit out the 14 days and perhaps try to thwart the creation of another Government. We fear that that could, inadvertently perhaps, bring the sovereign into an unintended and undesirable political conflict. Given that there is agreement to the trigger for an early election, with two-thirds voting, and my assurance that 14 days is the maximum, I hope my noble friend will be willing to withdraw his amendment. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, provides yet another model. His amendment would provide that a vote of no confidence in the Government should lead to an immediate Dissolution, and some of the comments I have already made apply to that situation. Another problem is that the only person who might have the authority to make a judgment on the fourth prong of the amendment—where the Prime Minister deemed a particular Motion to be a Motion of confidence—would be the Prime Minister. That would hand back to the Prime Minister one of the weapons that the Bill takes away from the Prime Minister. It has uncertainty attached to it and, although there is no provision in the Bill for a Speaker’s certificate, some form would be needed to establish the intent and will of the Prime Minister. It could take us back into areas of legal analysis and questioning that we have tried to avoid. The amendment would also provide that if any of the Motions set out in the clause were passed, the Prime Minister would have to seek Dissolution. That is what happened in 1979 but it is not what happened in 1924, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, noted. The answer given by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, does not meet that point because, again, it raises the question of bringing the monarch into a politically charged situation. Also, under Clause 3, the prerogative power of Dissolution is being removed and it is not clear how that situation would be dealt with. By leaving it up to the Prime Minister to decide whether any vote should be taken on a matter of confidence, the amendment would allow the Prime Minister to bring pressure to bear on Back-Benchers, a point made by my noble friend Lord Tyler. In a Bill that seeks to take power from the Prime Minister and give it to Parliament, a provision that would increase the power of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis his Back-Benchers does not sit easily. The Government believe that the amendment would, in practice, hand straight back to the Prime Minister the power to decide when to precipitate a general election. The noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, is not in his place—he is chairing a committee—but, in those circumstances, I hope he will reconsider and withdraw his amendment. The amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, seek, as I understand them—as with the amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Armstrong and Lord Howarth—to do away with the 14 days except where a Government have not enjoyed the confidence of the House to start with. They help to focus the issue. In bringing forward this Bill, the Government have sought to recognise the many conventions that exist. We have sought to recognise that, in triggering an early election, we respect the two consequences which convention has it flow from a defeat by the Government on a Motion of no confidence in the House of Commons. The first is that there could be a Dissolution and the second that a new Government could be formed. The occasion in 1979 is an example of when there was a Dissolution and the one in 1924 an example of when a new Government were formed. I accept that the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to deal with the situation in which the Government have been defeated in the very early days of the Parliament. It is important to remind ourselves that it is not just the Government who are saying that this is the position. In evidence to your Lordships' Constitution Committee, Professor Vernon Bogdanor, who is no fan of this Bill, said in response to a question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, on 27 October: "““Under the current situation, it is possible for an alternative government to be found in those circumstances””." That is, when there has been a vote of no confidence. He went on to say: "““That happened in 1924, when the first MacDonald minority Labour Government were defeated””." That is, not when Mr Baldwin’s Government were defeated but subsequently in 1924 when the minority Labour Government were defeated. Professor Bogdanor went on: "““The King's private secretary enquired of the other parliamentary leaders whether they were prepared to form a government and only when he was told that they weren't was a dissolution granted. If one of them had been, that alternative would have been perfectly possible under our present constitution””." We seek to maintain what is possible under the present constitution and indeed put a limit on it, because there is a limit of a maximum of 14 days to try to reform a Government. It is important that we try to maintain the existing constitutional conventions. By providing that a no-confidence Motion leads to an immediate general election in all other circumstances, we would be enshrining in statute the Executive’s ability to trigger an early election, if one follows the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord. That is complicated. In Committee, he said that he was against complication, but he seems to be complicating the matter even further if in some circumstances the 14 days would apply and in other circumstances it would not. As my noble friend Lord Tyler pointed out, this was not the position adopted by the noble and learned Lord’s honourable and right honourable friends in the other place, where Mr Bryant said: "““We quite like the provision for two weeks—it seems sensible if an alternative coalition or Government could be formed””.—[Official Report, Commons, 24/11/10; col. 361.]" Indeed, I think I am right in saying that an amendment to do otherwise—to take out the 14 days—was defeated by six votes to 498. I fear that the noble and learned Lord’s amendment could undermine the purpose of the Bill. He said at Second Reading that we should try to minimise the opportunity for manipulation. By going straight to Dissolution, you make manipulation a bit easier than if you have the 14-day provision for an alternative Government to be formed. In these circumstances, having reflected on what has been said in discussion in Committee and in today’s debate, I very much hope that your Lordships will support unamended the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport.