Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

My apologies. I am not sure that the World Cup has traditionally been at this time of year. It would clash with the exciting climax to the Premiership and the build-up to the FA Cup final, the Scottish Cup final and the Scottish Premier League, whatever shape or form they may be in by 2026. My point is that we have struggled and we cannot readily think of a situation in which one might wish to bring forward an election. It was our intention to future-proof the Bill, but, with regard to Amendments 12 and 14 in the names of my noble friends Lord Rennard, Lord Tyler and Lord Marks, I do not believe that by accepting them we undermine what we seek to achieve in the Bill. As has been pointed out, if it was necessary to bring forward a scheduled general election because the unforeseen event that none of us can think of actually happens, it would be open to the other place to pass a Dissolution Motion with the support of at least two- thirds of all MPs to trigger an early general election. That point was made by my noble friend Lord Norton. In the light of that, the Government would be willing to support these amendments and I hope your Lordships’ House would be willing to accept them. Amendment 16, also in the names of my noble friends Lord Rennard, Lord Tyler and Lord Marks, provides that an order made by the Prime Minister under Clause 1(5) must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the other place. That amendment also provides a role for the Speaker of the House of Commons in certifying that the order was approved in a Division and had the support of at least two-thirds of all MPs. I can see the thinking behind these amendments, as Clause 2 provides that a vote on an early Dissolution in the other place will require the support of at least two-thirds of all MPs. This measure in the Bill is designed to ensure that an early general election can take place where there is cross-party consensus on this. The two-thirds majority will put this power beyond the reach of a Government, since no Government since the Second World War have enjoyed a two-thirds majority, and the technical specifics of this mechanism have been broadly endorsed by the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House. However, the order-making power of Clause 1(5), which allows the Prime Minister to vary the date of a scheduled general election by up to two months, is somewhat different. Unlike the power the Bill would give the House of Commons for an early Dissolution, this power is limited to varying the date of a poll by up to two months. The key difference is that there are different safeguards applied to the order-making power. First, any order to vary the date of a scheduled general election would be subject to the affirmative procedure in both Houses of Parliament—a point picked up by my noble friend Lord Rennard. It means that an order would have to be debated and approved by this House as well as the other place. Also, it must be accompanied by a statement from the Prime Minister setting out the reasons for seeking to vary the date of the poll. In this Bill, as I have indicated on previous occasions in response to earlier amendments, we wanted to do what was strictly necessary to establish fixed terms. Crucially, we have sought not to set out in statute parliamentary procedures where it was not absolutely essential to do so. I do not believe that this amendment falls within that category. I also think it is important to note that this amendment would utilise the mechanism of the Speaker’s certification. No doubt we will return to this matter when we consider Clause 2 of the Bill. At this stage, I will flag up to noble Lords that I have added my name to an amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Howarth, Lord Martin and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, which would remove the Speaker’s certification in the context of Clause 2. I do not believe it would be appropriate to reinforce it here. In the light of the safeguards attached to the order-making power, I hope my noble friends will agree that this amendment is not necessary and will agree to withdraw it. I now turn to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Norton. The first would omit the order-making power from Clause 1 altogether; the subsequent amendments are consequential. My noble friend has reiterated concerns that he raised in Committee that the power in Clause 1(5) involves an important issue of principle—whether the Prime Minister should be able, by means of statutory instrument, to extend the life of a Parliament by up to two months. At the moment, it would require an Act of Parliament to extend a Parliament beyond the five-year limit set out in the Septennial Act as amended by the Parliament Act 1911. In Committee, my noble friend tabled amendments to say that such an extension could occur under the new regime of a fixed-term Parliament only if the Prime Minister were satisfied that the situation rendered holding the election at the scheduled time impractical or injurious to the economic, social or public health of the nation. As he indicated in moving this amendment, he now believes it would be better not to have it at all. It is clear that the purpose of this Bill is primarily that we expect Parliaments ordinarily to last five years. However, for reasons which, again, we have highlighted and discussed, it may not be possible or desirable to hold the election on the scheduled date. If primary legislation had to be taken to move the date of the scheduled election in an emergency, then as long as that Bill had the consent of your Lordships’ House there would be no limits to extending the lifetime of the Parliament. It could go beyond two months, as happened during the Second World War. If the particular emergency arose which required that, no doubt legislation would have to be crafted, as my noble friend said. We are envisaging an extension for a very short period. We believe that it is properly contained by the requirement for a majority in both Houses of Parliament and by the fact that we have accepted the recommendation that it will require the Prime Minister to set out the reasons for it. I reiterate that having considered these matters, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not consider the power to be inappropriate in principle. Against that background, I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.