Finance (No. 3) Bill

My hon. Friend makes a good point about the importance of this Bill putting first the needs of this country and, therefore, about the importance that others attach to it. I hope that we can seek support from members in all parts of the House for the need to act on the high-cost credit market. There has certainly been support among Government Back Benchers; noticeably, however, Government Front Benchers have so far reacted with negativity to that support. I hope that they will change their minds, given the possibilities that we have through the Bill, the amendment and, indeed, the regulatory measures being considered to make progress on an issue that concerns many Members. Our concerns are about a number of products—I want to put on record what we are talking about—and the lack of action on such products in contrast to dealing with the bank levy and whether it is applied appropriately. First, there are payday loans. Many people will be familiar with the concept of a short-term loan, and given that almost half of households cannot make their pay cheques last to the end of the month, it is no surprise that almost one third of households are now considering such products. Interest rates on such loans include one from a company called Oakam, of about 443%; and many people will be familiar with Wonga, whose rates are more at the 4,000% level. We are also talking about the home credit industry and companies such as Provident. Many people will be familiar with Provident going from door to door in their communities lending money to people at interest rates of, say, 272%. That means that if someone borrows just £300 from the company—perhaps to buy a new sofa or TV, or to fix a washing machine or a boiler that has gone wrong over the winter—that will cost them £546. Were we to use this amendment and the opportunity of the bank levy to deal with some of these problems and with the actions of some of these companies, we would be encouraging the Government to look at the concept of adequacy and consider some of the issues in that market. First, there is the lack of competition in providing credit to those who are denied mainstream credit. That is embodied by the fact that there is no innovation in these products; they are very similar. There is therefore a great contrast with people who are able to borrow from mainstream creditors. Many people will be familiar with mainstream banks offering preferential rates and loyalty schemes to customers who they want to hold on to because they know that they have alternative sources of credit. We could apply the bank levy to the question of adequacy and ask whether these companies are acting in a way that is detrimental to consumers and whether the lack of competition is detrimental to consumers and to our economy. Many people have expressed concern that our banking industry is already overloaded, which requires more competition. I would argue that there needs to be more competition in lending to people who cannot access mainstream credit, and this is one way in which we could achieve that. A quarter of the customers who use high-cost-credit companies cannot borrow from other lenders. As a consequence, they do not build up the evidence of being good borrowers that would allow them to use mainstream sources of credit. These companies do not share information on their customers, making it incredibly difficult for customers to prove that they could use more mainstream sources of credit. The question of adequacy could also be applied to companies' use of rollovers and stepping up of loans, which means that borrowers are stuck with using them. In particular, because they often lend only small amounts of money to begin with—