Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

My Lords, I, too, support the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, as to the need for careful consideration of constitutional reform. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, accurately pointed out that the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, did not suggest that a referendum is required in relation to the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments. As the Committee well knows, the Constitution Committee expressed grave concern in paragraph 20 of our report that this Bill owes, "““more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles””." I suggest that the Government’s position in relation to whether a referendum on constitutional reform is appropriate is precisely a matter that appears to be determined by short-term considerations—alternative vote, yes; reform of this House and fixed-term Parliaments, apparently no. It is very difficult to deny that the Bill that we are currently considering will introduce major constitutional reform. In paragraph 40 of our report, we refer to the evidence that we heard from Professor Vernon Bogdanor in which he pointed out that the Bill, if enacted, will prevent, "““a newly chosen Prime Minister between Parliaments from going to the country””," it will prevent, "““a Prime Minister who has a new policy for which he may seek a mandate from going to the country””," and: "““Most importantly of all, because we could be moving into that situation with our hung Parliaments, it means that coalitions can change in the middle of a Parliament without the people being allowed to pronounce on that””." This is a major constitutional reform. I am no fan of referendums, but I would welcome guidance from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, on behalf of the Government, as to what their policy is as to when a referendum is appropriate for constitutional reform and when it is not, and I would welcome an assurance that that issue is not determined by short-term political considerations.