Loans to Ireland Bill

I always try to avoid sharing the hon. Gentleman's pleasure. I shall come to the nature of the deal, because in debating the Bill we are discussing one element that constitutes a little more than half of the money that the UK taxpayer is putting into the deal. The argument for treating Ireland as a special case is clear. I shall reiterate some of the points that the Chancellor made. Our two countries are intertwined in commerce, in trade, in banking, in culture and in sport. We share a language and a land border. Not only is Ireland one of our five largest export markets but, as the Chancellor said, one part of the United Kingdom—Northern Ireland—sends 40% of its exports across the border to the Republic. The situation in Ireland could cause significant damage to UK financial institutions and create instability in both sovereign and bank debt markets. The UK is Ireland's largest creditor—we are talking about almost €112 billion—and I understand from a newspaper report last week that the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds have Irish loan books worth 82% and 53% of net assets respectively. In its report last month, the International Monetary Fund singled out Ireland to demonstrate what it called the ““key underlying vulnerability”” of UK banks' exposure to foreign banks. The support programme assures the protection of senior bond holders in Irish banks from any losses, thus affording a greater level of protection to UK banks. For all of those reasons and many more, it is in this country's interest to support this package. I want to raise three concerns. The first, which was raised in a couple of interventions—including by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash)—is the open-ended nature of the commitment. There is a distinct possibility of more money being required for Ireland after 2013, given the tendency of Irish banks to downplay the severity of their situation and the tough conditionality being applied alongside concerns about European growth. In those circumstances, should we not make it clear to our European partners that the EFSF must be used for any further financial support, rather than giving the impression that this is a well into which further buckets can be dipped? That is particularly relevant to my second concern about the balance between the contributions made by the various mechanisms. The €440 billion EFSF—the facility— for eurozone countries only is being tapped for 4% of the total resources that eurozone countries have agreed to make available for Ireland. The smaller EFSM—the mechanism—of which we are part and to which we contribute, was not used at all for the Greek bail-out. The EFSM is offering 37.5% of its available resources for the Irish bail-out. Why was that formulation chosen and why is the total amount we are contributing double the amount that we would have had to pay if we were a eurozone country?