European Union Bill

My hon. Friend is right to make that correction. He is also right when he refers to the importance of the jurisdiction of the ECJ as a relevant new feature of any justice and home affairs measure that is brought forward subsequent to the Lisbon treaty. That is the thing that makes such a profound difference between third-pillar arrangements and the current treaty arrangements. That is why when Ministers—usually the Justice Secretary or Home Secretary—come to the European Affairs Committee of the Cabinet with a proposed decision on a justice and home affairs measure, they are required, as a standard part of Government policy, to produce an analysis of the likely impact of ECJ jurisdiction on our law if the United Kingdom participated in the measure, and also to assess the risks that this would lead to competence creep. My hon. Friend is right that that is an important consideration that we need to take into account when judging the balance of national interests that determines whether we choose to opt in to, or stay out of, a particular decision. My hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke), along with a number of other hon. Members, asked why we needed to opt in at all, because if we have not gone through the whole scrutiny process, we should just leave it and opt out. The treaty gives us a three-month period within which we have to decide whether we want to make an initial opt-in. We can, if we choose, opt out at that stage, let the negotiations take place on the final version of the measure, and then opt in to the final text, as agreed by the others taking part. The problem with what he suggested is that it is not a reliable method of ensuring that our national interests are properly represented, for a number of reasons. First, if we wait until the final stage, we have to ask the Commission if we may participate. The Council is then able to specify conditions under which United Kingdom can do so. If we judge that the balance of advantage points towards our opting in, there is a further advantage in getting in first. Secondly, if we participate on the first occasion on which we can opt in, we will then be at the table with a vote, helping to shape the final status of the text. We will not be in anything like as influential a position if we make a decision first to stay out. Thirdly, if we are not taking part, we have no vote on the final text. There are sometimes occasions—perhaps on a counter-terrorism measure—where we might decide that, on balance, it will be in our national interest to opt in, but where we dislike one particular element of the draft text. Perhaps we also know that two or three other key member states have similar reservations. In those circumstances, it is possible that the Government's decision would be to opt in by the end of the three-month period, with the aim of putting together an alliance with those other member states so as to secure through negotiation a final text that meets our interests and means that we are completely content with the outcome.