Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time. I am grateful to Members who have taken part in debates on the Bill, in particular the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), who sadly is not in his place, and members of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, who have been forensic in their scrutiny. The Bill's reforms are an essential part of the Government's drive to modernise Parliament. Currently, a Prime Minister can, effectively, call an election on a whim—a situation that my colleague and friend, the late Lord Holme of Cheltenham, once described as a race in which the Prime Minister is allowed to approach the track with his or her running shoes in one hand and the starting pistol in the other. Something as important as the timing of a general election must not be determined by the whims of Prime Ministers and the self-interest of political parties. I believe that all parties agree on that. The Bill proposes the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments, bringing a new stability to our political system and, crucially, ensuring that when Parliament does dissolve early, that is a matter for this House. Debate on the Bill has been vigorous. That is why we allowed extra time in Committee. While we may not see eye to eye with colleagues on the Opposition Benches on every detail, throughout the debates there was broad agreement on what it seeks to achieve. Let me turn briefly to some of the issues that have attracted most attention. First, on early dissolution, the Bill provides that Parliament will be dissolved early only if at least two thirds of MPs vote for dissolution or if a Government are unable to secure the confidence of the House of Commons within 14 days of a no-confidence vote—passed on a simple majority, exactly as is provided for right now. Those arrangements are complementary. They are workable. Most importantly, they strengthen the power of Parliament to hold Government to account. We are proposing a new power for the House to vote for an early dissolution, as well as, for the first time, giving legal effect to the existing procedures for a vote of no confidence. I ask Members to note that the Constitution Committee in the other place has endorsed those two mechanisms for triggering an early election. The Government do not accept the concern that the new right to dissolve Parliament will undermine this House's exclusive cognisance. Such an important constitutional innovation absolutely should be laid down in statute, but we are confident that the courts will continue to regard matters certified by the Speaker as relating to proceedings in Parliament, which are, in turn, protected by the Bill of Rights. I was delighted that the Constitution Committee—a Committee that includes distinguished parliamentarians and lawyers—agreed with the Government's assessment of the Bill's interaction with parliamentary privilege. On the length of Parliaments, we have looked into the suggestion that four years is preferable to five. It is true that this is not an exact science. It is a question of judgment, but, all the arguments considered, we remain of the strong view that five years, the current maximum and more recently the norm, will encourage the stability and long-term perspective that British politics too often lacks.