Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for restoring my faith in his credentials, although he has destroyed those of the hon. Member for Rhondda. The hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford put his finger on what was wrong with the debate once we had prised him from his views on reasonably priced white wine, because he made the point, which I think was backed up by the hon. Member for Foyle, who mentioned an Urquhart-like Prime Minister, that many of the rather apocalyptic views of what an evil denizen of No. 10 might do seem to be founded on fancy, rather than on experience or expectation. We have been asked repeatedly to assume that every convention that applies has applied and will apply, whether the Bill becomes law, as I hope it will, or not. All those conventions would be summarily set aside. It has been suggested that there would be confidence motions that no Member of the House, not even Mr Speaker, would recognise as confidence motions. It has been suggested that Prime Ministers who lose a vote of confidence might refuse to resign and remain in office despite the fact that they had lost the vote, or that if once they resign they might somehow give posthumous advice from beyond the political grave to Her Majesty to prorogue and therefore frustrate the intentions of the House and of the legislation. It is then suggested that Her Majesty, in a way that has never been the experience of any Member of this House or our predecessors, would be so forgetful of her constitutional duty that she would not ask another leader capable of commanding the confidence of the House to form a Government and end any temporary Prorogation. I believe that those are fanciful concerns. I accept that they are theoretically possible, but I ask the House to consider whether any of those things have happened. Almost all of them are included in the conventions that cover our political system and our current constitutional arrangements and will persist after the passage of the Bill. I am indebted to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, which someone casually looking at our debate might imagine had been critical of the provisions in this part of the Bill, but far from it. It examined the matter in some detail, and the witnesses were unanimous in their view. Paragraph 147 states:"““Professor Bradley agreed that such a possibility, while theoretically possible, 'would be very unsatisfactory and British politics would have sunk to a new low.'””" Professor Bogdanor was mentioned earlier, and the confidences of the tutorials between him and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) might or might not have been breached, but he suggested that the situation could reasonably"““be left to the discretion of a 'wise constitutional monarch'””," which is indeed what we have,"““who would not prorogue at the request of a Prime Minister who no longer had the confidence of the House.””" The Committee, having heard the evidence rather than the conjecture, concluded:"““We agree that the risk of abuse of the power of prorogation is very small. We therefore conclude that Her Majesty's power to prorogue Parliament should remain.””" So, there was very clear advice from the noble members of that Lords Committee, and I am sure that it will colour their consideration of the matter. We have heard from lots of people who profess to know what happened in Canada, but, just in case there are lingering concerns about the extraordinary situation of the Prorogation that apparently saved the Canadian Government, I note that the Lords Committee took evidence from an academic who probably knows a little more than any of us in this House about the Canadian political system. Professor Henry Milner, from l'université de Montréal, stated in his evidence:"““The Canadian case was unique because prorogation saved the government, which it normally should not. ... [The] circumstances [were] so unusual that you could not imagine them. I would have to give you each of the steps in the Canadian case, all of which were unlikely and all of which fitted together. Frankly, I would not worry about it.””" That is probably a safe conclusion for this House. On the proposed changes before us, I shall deal, first, with new clause 4, tabled by the hon. Member for Rhondda, and the consequential amendments 2, 3 and 4, which would give the House a new and exclusive power to prorogue Parliament. Most contributors to the debate were clear about this, but we need to make a clear distinction between Dissolution and Prorogation, because they are very different things, and the Government believe it important that the Bill provides the House with the power to decide when there should be a Dissolution of Parliament. It is legitimate to give the House control over early Dissolution, because that will take place only in circumstances where the Government of the day have lost the confidence of the House and can therefore no longer lead the country effectively, or where a two-thirds majority of elected MPs has passed a motion calling for an early election. Those are matters directly concerned with the choice of Government and the election of Members, and it is right that this elected House should have primacy. Prorogation, however, is a different matter. Hon. Members will know that it is a mechanism to bring to an end a Session of Parliament. It determines, subject to the carry-over procedure, when Bills must have completed their passage through both Houses so that they become law. That relates to the point that several hon. Members made, whereby, if we prorogue while Bills are still in process, they are lost. Sometimes, an incoming Government will wish that; sometimes, they will not, particularly if they are of a similar political complexion to the previous Administration. The hon. Gentleman's new clause places no obligation to consult or agree with the other place on the timing or length of Prorogation, even though it affects that House equally. The new clause would therefore give this House a controlling hand over the conduct of business in the other place by providing us with the power to dictate when the other House must have completed its business. That would be a significant departure from the current situation in the wash-up, and some might view it as an unwelcome extension of this House's powers. As I said in earlier debates, through this Bill the Government seek to make only those changes to the constitution necessary to facilitate the principle of fixed-term Parliaments. The proposed new clause seems to fall wide of that intention. I have to draw attention to a few technical deficiencies. I am always slightly loth to do so, as Members often wish to raise and debate a principle and the drafting falls short of their intention, but we need to examine the matter, because we are on Report. First, there is some ambiguity about where the actual power of Prorogation would lie. Proposed new subsection (3) states:"““The Speaker of the House of Commons shall not make such a declaration unless the House of Commons has passed a resolution directing him to do so on or before a specific date and time.””" So, the House would clearly direct the Speaker. In proposed new subsection (4), however, the Speaker may vary the period of Prorogation by an unlimited number of days, apparently without a direction from the House. There is no mechanism to specify how the Speaker might make such a declaration when the House is not sitting on account of its having been prorogued. That is particularly important, given that the new clause states that the Speaker may vary the date of Prorogation ““to an earlier…day,”” presumably to provide for the option of recalling Parliament when it is prorogued. We can only assume, however, that the new clause intends the Speaker to have the power to decide unilaterally when Parliament may return from a period of Prorogation, and, if it is intended that the Speaker should do so on advice, the new clause does not make it clear on whose advice that would be. If the intention is that the House must direct the Speaker when varying the period of Prorogation, the proposed system will not allow that to happen, and that seems to be inconsistent with the desire to place the power relating to Prorogation with a decision of the House itself. Further, it is not clear whether proposed new subsection (3) is intended to replace or supplement the existing Prorogation announcement that is made to both Houses and read in the other place with this House in attendance. I accept that that is not an insuperable barrier to the new clause, and we have heard differing views on the value of the Prorogation ceremony: the hon. Member for Rhondda rather likes it; the hon. Member for Foyle feels that bicorn hats are not his style. Nevertheless, that is part of our constitutional settlement and part of the procedures of the House, and a lot of people quite like to wander down the corridor to hear the Prorogation ceremony and, as the hon. Member for Rhondda says from a sedentary position, a little Norman French—which we hear so little of nowadays. On the basis of those arguments, the Government are not able to support new clause 4 and its consequential amendments.