Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

My Lords, this legislation has been constructed in haste and is being pushed through Parliament in haste. It was constructed in haste during the hasty negotiation of the coalition agreement; it is being introduced in the first Session of a new Parliament—so there was no Green Paper, no consultative process, nor, indeed, as has been noted, was there any pre-legislative scrutiny within Parliament; and it was very hastily proceeded with in the other place before it reached us. For all these reasons, it is right and proper that it should be carefully scrutinised not only by us here in this House now, but also on the basis that my noble friend Lord Wills has put forward. Under my noble friend’s proposal for a committee of inquiry, the great advantage would be that people of enormous experience and wisdom would be brought into the process, and it would be conducted in a context that would ensure impartiality. I am sure that noble Lords want to produce the right outcome in the broader interests of our constitution and our country, but it is in the nature of the adversarial processes that characterise our Parliament that it is very difficult to achieve a consensus in parliamentary proceedings. However, under the process that my noble friend has advocated there would be a real prospect of being able to reach a large measure of agreement, proposals could be recommended not only to us but to the people of this country, and there would be a wider public debate on the interim recommendations of my noble friend’s committee and then, of course, on its final conclusions. That would be a better way to approach these enormously important issues and responsibilities than the way that the coalition Government have adopted. Frankly, the way that the Government have introduced this Bill, and the way they are proceeding with it, is not a good way to govern. These are major issues that need to be treated with proper deliberation, bipartisanship and responsibility—issues such as the appropriate size of constituencies, the number of Members of Parliament who should serve in the House of Commons, the make-up of a House of Commons that very possibly will be elected under the alternative votes system instead of first past the post, the relationship between a Member of Parliament and his constituents, and the relationship between Parliament and the Executive. One recites the issues that fall to be resolved in this process and it is self-evident that they are of major importance to the health of our democratic culture and to the good functioning of our Parliament. So my noble friend’s recommendation is one that we ought to welcome and embrace. Among the particular issues that he has itemised and drawn attention to in his complex amendment is the relative importance of electoral equality. The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, spoke very well on that issue. Coming—as he also does—from Wales, I am particularly conscious of the devastating impact on the structure of political life in Wales that a dogmatic insistence on numerical equality in the size of constituencies would bring about. We have a responsibility not to proceed as recklessly as that. Of course it is desirable, other things being equal, that constituencies should be more or less of equal size, but I think that the very narrow margin of fluctuation of 5 per cent either side of the norm of 76,000 electors that the Government propose is simply inadequate. So the committee of inquiry ought to examine the options for a 5 per cent toleration, a 10 per cent variation and, indeed, other margins of flexibility, so that the desirability of constituencies being of equal size should be weighed against what is also, surely we must all agree, highly desirable—that the integrity and character of particular communities should be recognised and respected and, of course, that the relationship between parliamentary constituencies and the boundaries of local authorities should also be so designed as to make sense. The Deputy Prime Minister compares this legislation in its significance to the Great Reform Act of 1832. But the difference between his approach in this measure and the approach which was enacted in the 1832 legislation is that it was the 1832 legislation that, for the first time, established in our parliamentary culture and our practical parliamentary arrangements the representation of communities. It was because people in the newly urbanising and industrialising communities, particularly in the north, objected to being represented in Parliament by county MPs, and because people in the counties themselves found that unacceptable, that the pressure grew to look again at how parliamentary representation was constructed. It was in consequence of the 1832 measure that the great industrial cities and the new industrial communities—Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Bury, Rochdale, Bradford; these very significant and very important places—got proper parliamentary representation and that, for the first time, the people who lived in those places had the chance to elect their own Members of Parliament and to hold their own Members of Parliament to account. Of course the accountability was imperfect on the limited franchise, but we saw a development from that point which led to a state of affairs in which—even though the pressure for reform rightly persisted for more than 100 years after that, and there is still pressure for reform—there was a pride in the British constitution and an ownership of the British constitution. We all are concerned that that pride in our constitution has diminished. However, hastily spatchcocked reforming measures which are perceived, fairly or unfairly, to be tainted by a bias in terms of party interest—for example, whether the number of 600 constituencies, a figure apparently arbitrarily chosen, has been calculated to be to the disadvantage of the Labour Party—give rise to doubts and questionings about the process that we are engaged in at the moment, not only for noble Lords on this side of the House but for many people in the country. Many people are very uncertain whether this is the right way to be going. If we could take the suspicion of partisan politics out of the process through the establishment of the committee of inquiry proposed in this amendment then we would help to build the public’s confidence in this important reforming process. We shall of course have opportunities to debate specific amendments about numerical equality and what exceptions should be allowed for that, but let us recognise now that there are protests coming from Cornwall, from the Isle of Wight and Ynys Mon which have to be taken seriously. There is a danger that places which regard themselves as authentic communities will be split and that others will be yoked together with places with which the residents of both feel that they have nothing in common. That will not be at all good for confidence let alone for pride in our parliamentary democracy. My noble friend Lord Wills also rightly makes the point in subsection 2(b) of his amendment that the House of Commons is part of a much larger system. You cannot simply take a chunk of the constitution and push it, pull it around, mould it and remake it as if it was a piece of plasticine while ignoring the impact that a change in one part of the constitution has on other parts. If you alter the size of the House of Commons, if you alter the relationship between Members of Parliament and the Executive, and if you alter the capacity of Members of the House of Commons to scrutinise legislation, from all of these things there necessarily follow major implications for the work of this House. It has been noted by a number of speakers that we ought also to consider the relationship between the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the devolved representative institutions of government. I think that that point is not included in my noble friend’s amendment, but perhaps we can reconsider his amendment on Report, and perhaps amendments can be made to his amendment so as to perfect the excellent scheme that he has put forward for our consideration. Additionally, the relationship between Members of the House of Commons and elected members in local government has always to be considered when you are considering making changes to the House of Commons. You cannot change the House of Commons in isolation without there being very important implications. It is not of course just the interests of MPs and elected councillors that count, although their capacity to do their job is in itself important, but we have to consider above all the interests and views of members of the public. My noble friend and indeed all of us agree that the present system of boundary reviews is imperfect and needs to be reformed because clearly it takes too long to achieve changes in boundaries. But how long the Boundary Commission ought to take in its processes is not something that we are going to be able to resolve in the course of debates in this House or back in another place. As a number of noble Lords have already argued today, it is again of the greatest importance to ensure that boundaries are appropriately determined, and particularly that the people who are to be represented by Members of the House of Commons have themselves had an opportunity to contribute to the formation of the judgment and decision as to what the revised boundaries ought to be. This is a complex matter that needs impartial, expert and thorough consideration which again a committee of inquiry would be well placed to undertake. For this and a considerable number of other reasons, what my noble friend has suggested is a helpful and excellent idea. My noble friend did suggest the committee of inquiry should be a Royal Commission, but hearts are slightly liable to sink at that suggestion because Royal Commissions have a reputation for taking minutes and going on for years, or whatever the saying is. But he has written in to his amendment that an interim report should be made each year and that there should be a final report within three years of the passing of this Bill. Although I think it would be a tight squeeze, it would then be possible for all the key decisions to be taken within the life of this Parliament. Perhaps not all the consequential legislation could be enacted, but the decisions would be taken so that this would indeed have proved to be a great reforming Parliament. The coalition could claim with better justification that it was a great reforming Government, but the reform should have been designed on the basis of impartial, expert and thorough deliberation instead of hasty legislation subject to the force majeure of the Whips. That is not a good basis for ensuring lasting and well-judged reform.